

THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY
PRESENCE IN EUROPE

Lloyd J. Matthews
Editor

May 2000

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at rummellr@awc.carlisle.army.mil

Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm>

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at outreach@awc.carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-021-4

CONTENTS

Foreword	vii
1. The Future of the U.S.-European Relationship: Framing the Discussion <i>John J. Hamre</i>	1
Questions and Answers	8
2. The Role of U.S. Forces in Europe <i>Wesley K. Clark</i>	13
Questions and Answers	31
3. Staying in Europe: A Vital American Interest <i>Klaus Naumann</i>	37
4. America's Stance Toward Europe: Moving Away from a NATO-Centered Policy <i>Ted Galen Carpenter</i>	45
5. Europe as a Strategic Staging Base for 21st Century Stabilization Operations <i>Robert H. Scales, Jr.</i>	53
Questions, Answers and Commentary, Chapters 3 to 5	59
6. The Enlarging Role of NATO <i>Stephen Larrabee</i>	69
7. Guiding NATO's Future: A Return to Basics <i>Charles Glaser</i>	75
8. An Additional Role for NATO: Promoting Collective Security Elsewhere <i>Carl Kaysen</i>	83
Questions, Answers and Commentary, Chapters 6 to 8	87
9. Updating NATO Forces for the 21st Century <i>Thomas G. McInerney</i>	95

10. Modernizing, Restructuring, Adaptation: Imperatives for NATO Forces <i>Jay Garner</i>	101
11. America's Diminishing Commitment to NATO: Implications for Service Force Structure <i>John J. Mearsheimer</i>	107
Questions, Answers and Commentary, Chapters 9 to 11	113
12. Whither the U.S.-NATO Partnership: Consensus and Dissent <i>Lloyd J. Matthews</i>	129
About the Authors	141

FIGURES

1. U.S. European Command and NATO Command . . .	15
2. Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Surrounding Region	19
3. Growth of Air Assets	24
4. Air Operations Snapshot	24
5. Strike Sorties by Date.	25

FOREWORD

Ten years have elapsed since the fall of the Berlin Wall, which served as a fitting symbol for the end of the Cold War. That historic juncture brought into question the main edifice of western European security arrangements—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—that had served Alliance members so well since NATO's founding in 1949. It also brought into question the rationale for America's continued deep involvement in European security affairs. With the gradual realization that the Russian menace is essentially dead, at least for the next 10 to 15 years and perhaps longer, and with NATO's missions having evolved well beyond the original purpose of territorial defense, debate on both sides of the Atlantic has begun to intensify concerning the vital issue of where NATO should be headed and America's relation to the Alliance.

To bring an array of informed voices to the debate, four institutions—the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies of the University of Chicago, and the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago—joined hands to sponsor a symposium titled “The Future of U.S. Military Presence in Europe,” held at the University of Chicago on August 4, 1999.

The present book is an outgrowth of this symposium. It is not designed to set forth a literal record of words and events in the mold of the traditional symposium “proceedings,” but rather is organized as an anthology of individual chapters complemented by selected questions, answers, and comments by symposium participants and attendees. The symposium opening address by Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre (Chapter 1) and the keynote address by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Wesley Clark (Chapter 2) cogently set the stage for discussion. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 address the first panel topic, “Is Europe Still Strategically Important to the United

States?" Chapters 6, 7, and 8 tackle the second topic, "Potential New Missions for NATO in the 21st Century," while Chapters 9, 10, and 11 are devoted to the last topic, "What Type of Deployed Forces Does the United States Require to Meet Its Commitments in Europe?

Noteworthy among the commentaries is the wrap-up on pages 124-128 by General Crosbie E. Saint (USA Ret.). As Commander in Chief of U.S. Army Europe during the period of the Gulf War, General Saint supplied the U.S. Army VII Corps, nominally slated as an element of NATO forces, to the coalition command that executed Operation DESERT STORM.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

CHAPTER 1

THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP: FRAMING THE DISCUSSION

John J. Hamre

In the history of the United States, there have been five distinct epochs or periods of American security policy. The first was from about 1776 until 1812, though it is a little hard to find exact demarcation points. It obviously covered the formation of the new republic, which did not instantly form at the end of the Battle at Yorktown. It took quite a while for the republic to jell. The early Congress almost immediately threw away the Army and Navy. The Revenue Cutter Service, the predecessor of the Coast Guard, became the de facto Navy for some 10 years because the early Congress said, in effect, "We don't need a navy now, we don't need an army." It cut the Army down to 50 people. It became clear by 1812 that cutting the Army wasn't a good idea. And it became even clearer when the British in 1814 sailed up the Potomac and set fire to Washington. The first epoch was thus one in which we were getting our feet on the ground, getting ourselves organized, thinking about defense, and developing the philosophy we were going to need to undergird the republic for the rest of its history.

The second epoch extends from 1814-1818 roughly to the turn of the century. Obviously, there were some significant events during that period, like the Civil War. But in terms of our international security posture, it was a period when the United States was relatively free to expand into the inner territories of the North American continent. We were very content simply with growing into the heartland of America. We had relatively modest interests overseas, and we were largely sheltered by the British navy. Thus we were preoccupied with ourselves during that second epoch. It ended, of course, with the Spanish American War.

The third period, which some think of as America's imperial phase, saw the United States turn outward, by design annexing territory overseas and making it part of America. The third period was culminated by our expeditionary support for Allied forces during World War I, when, in an atypically American act, we sent a large army overseas, thus involving ourselves in what George Washington called a "foreign war." I'm not sure there is such a thing as a foreign war for America any more. With the globe today being so small, what were once perceived as foreign wars now usually seem to be in our own backyard. In any event, we made a conscious decision to get deeply involved in the Great War, and the third epoch drew to a close with the end of that war.

On entering the interwar years—the fourth security epoch—America chose to retrench. In a way, this period marked a kind of void in America's military and security history. But it was enormously important in a broader sense, for it was the time when the two great forces of the 20th century emerged. On one hand, global recession set in, leading to the rise of national socialism in Germany and ultimately to World War II. On the other hand, international communism, centered in the Soviet Union, would arise, joining in an uneasy marriage of convenience with the West to combat the Nazi scourge.

The fifth security epoch emerged from the ashes of World War II—we commonly characterize it as the Cold War. It was a time when the traditional international security order was shattered. In its place a new order emerged, initially very bipolar in character. That configuration diffused significantly by 1960, but it still dominated our security milieu during the second half of this century until the historic date of November 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall came tumbling down.

I recall the first time I saw the Wall. It was ominous, frightening. I never thought in my wildest imagination I would live long enough to see it down. Then I remember

going back another time. We went down late at night. As we got closer, we began to hear this “chink, chink, chink.” People were chipping away the wall, collecting pieces to sell as souvenirs to tourists like me the next day. There were other people busy with paint and brushes because the pieces were worth more if they had paint on them. Typical entrepreneurialism at work. Thus the fifth epoch ended in 1989. We are now 10 years into the next epoch, the sixth. But what is this new period? It’s very hard to know. We know roughly when it started, but we don’t know where it’s going. Indeed, where it’s going is the subject of the present book.

Though things are still pretty fuzzy, I believe it is possible to discern some of the main features that will likely distinguish this sixth epoch of American security history. While the United States has emerged as the only global superpower, it has not established a *pax Americana* in any sense. Indeed, one trait of the sixth epoch is the disturbing ethnic tribalism that now seems to characterize the international security order. There are some 40 to 50 such struggles going on around the world at this time, some of them dreadful in the carnage and violence they produce.

A second trait is the frightening devolution of the resources of violence from the old Soviet empire. For a variety of reasons, those resources are becoming broadly available in the new world. This huge arsenal of biological and chemical weapons, and possibly even components of nuclear weapons, may fall into the hands of very dangerous people. Moreover, the large stable of Russian military engineers and scientists left over from the Soviet era could very well be lured into employment by elements inimicable to our security. These are very troubling fall-outs from the Soviet period.

A third trait is the emergence of strange and uncontrollable new transnational actors on the scene. Guerrilla organizations like that of Osama bin Laden, for example, appear able to shift and move in and out of

government structures. It is very hard to know how you deter these sorts of new actors since they are not always dependent on the normal structures of government wherein and around which deterrence has evolved during the last 50 years.

But several other transnational forces have emerged on the scene that have implications for our security—the globalization of entertainment and information typified by the Internet, for example. The emergence of international crime is increasingly difficult to distinguish from international terrorism. In Colombia, we could soon find on the international stage the first narco-state. Another of these transnational forces is disease. Few realize how profound the changes might be in Africa if the AIDS epidemic there continues in its current pattern.

Also important to note is the transnational shift of jobs. An American product today may have the computer chips made in China, the software written in India, the handsets made in Ireland, the satellite made in Italy, the launch occurring in Russia, and we call it an American telephone system. Ours is a profoundly different world where the jobs have now gone international, and this trend extends even to armaments. The global spread of armaments and the technology of armaments, as we have seen, flows in large measure from the disintegration of the old Soviet empire. But not entirely because there are now some emergent rogue actors such as North Korea, whose only source of political pride and cash is the sale of items like Nodong missiles.

What, then, are the broader implications of all these features of the new security epoch? We can only see through the glass darkly, but some of those implications are beginning to appear at least in dim outline. For one, stability is going to be an increasingly rare phenomenon in this new epoch. The previous epoch, the Cold War epoch, was at least characterized by great inertia. Though huge forces were at work, they moved very slowly. That doesn't

appear to be the character of this new epoch. Second, it seems that many of the international structures that were created to mediate and manage security problems during the Cold War epoch are increasingly brittle, if not ineffective, in this new epoch. Recall how unnerved we all were during the Asian economic crisis of 1998 when it appeared that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund could not cope because the disruptive forces had grown bigger than the economic and financial structures put in place by the industrial nations to rationalize the international movement of capital. There was widespread talk about having to re-engineer the entire system. The problem seems to have abated, at least for the time being, but I'm not at all sure the underlying factors tending toward instability have been rectified. After all, capital is more global today than at any time in history and becoming more so.

The United Nations (UN) is increasingly irrelevant because of the lack of consensus in the Security Council, a structure that requires unanimity before effective action can be taken. It is only the rare uncontroversial mission that attracts sufficient support among UN members to pave the way to action. When it comes to a big issue, like the Balkans, the UN is frozen into immobility. Thus the structures of the Cold War era are increasingly inapplicable in this new period. There remains a question mark over NATO in this regard. It is remarkable how NATO evolved to the point of being able to contemplate uninvited military action in a sovereign out-of-area state—it was the tragic situation in Kosovo that made it happen. Yet I worry about what I see in U.S. domestic political reactions to Kosovo and NATO operations there.

When General Wesley Clark and I and others were at a NATO conference in June 1999, I was struck by the absolutely consistent view by other governments as to what the Kosovo situation was all about. It was the first time in history that NATO went to war for an idea. The governments were saying that since they could not justify

intervention on grounds of self-interest, they would appeal to a transcendent ideal to justify it. In other words, it was not sufficiently noble to go to war for national interests any longer. Governments must have a moral basis such as human rights to justify military action. I was startled by the uniformity of this view. It worries me frankly that creating political stability is not a sufficiently justifiable reason to go to war. Instead, we have to discover some transcendent ideal to justify democracies in acting.

The United States was not immune to such thinking. Prior to NATO's decision to launch Operation ALLIED FORCE, there was a great deal of domestic questioning in that regard. Thus, at the very time when we're confronting a world that is more tumultuous and less stable, we appear to be experiencing an erosion of the traditional basis on which democracies are willing to go to war. They seem to be willing to do so only for more idealistic values. One must wonder about the staying power of public support in this sort of moral environment when the armed forces begin taking casualties.

Everything thus far written in this chapter bears upon, but does not answer, the key question—"What is the future of the U.S. military presence in Europe?" Not having a crystal ball, neither I nor anyone else can answer this question except to note that it is a subset of a still broader question—"What is America's security posture going to be in this sixth security epoch? Should we organize and orient ourselves around the policies and structures which currently are the residue of the previous epoch? Or should we shift to something that's radically new, something that we don't yet understand?"

For example, we have a vigorous debate going on in Washington over the F-22 fighter aircraft. The F-22 is a weapon system designed at the height of the Cold War. One of our most defense-minded Congressional committees decided we should live without the F-22 because its great expense would usurp money for other essential military

programs. Should we at the Department of Defense (DoD) fight to get it back because it is going to be essential for future war? Or is it an unnecessary relic of the previous epoch whose purchase would keep us from resourcing what we really will need for the future? These are very tough questions. In 1997 the congressionally-created National Defense Panel criticized DoD for remaining mired in the Cold War past. The implication was that though we've accomplished a little downsizing, we're continuing to maintain the same kind of force we had during the Cold War. Moreover, according to this view, such a posture prevents retooling in preparation for the security challenges of the next epoch. Such criticism overlooks the fact that more than once in the last 4 years we've had to mount two nearly simultaneous operations. When will the time come when we don't have to worry about Korea? Or about Europe? Certainly such worries have not been groundless in the past decade. Thus, to repeat, the question of whether to buy for the contingencies from the past or retool for the uncertainties of the future is not susceptible to an easy answer.

The foregoing question is particularly problematic as it relates to the Army. Even though we may be in for a long period of transition to a radically different force, we still must confront the current challenges, which argue for maintaining pretty much what we look like today. The U.S. Army needs to be in Europe today because it represents the connective tissue that holds together the security structure of Europe.

I worry that American public support for forces in Europe seems to be atrophying. Moreover, the Europeans themselves seem not at all certain concerning their security arrangements for the future. Thus, even if the U.S. Army remains this connective tissue, what is it connecting? What will it be connecting in 10 years? We have a national requirement to keep our European allies firmly engaged in the debate. This is why we are willing to talk very intensively with them about their own defense initiatives,

that is, where they want to have an autonomous capability to act in the security arena apart from the United States. I'm deeply skeptical that such autonomous capabilities will eventuate, because the Europeans are not buying what it takes to do that.¹ But I'm glad they're talking about it. The worst thing that could happen is for them to say, "We won't ever worry about security because the United States will come in if the situation ever gets serious." Such thinking would be a very serious step in the wrong direction. Thus the U.S. Army has to transform itself while at the same time serving as the connective tissue holding the security structure together in Europe for the time being.

But if the Army holds onto a nostalgic vision of its grand past, it's going to atrophy and die. The Army that existed through the 1970s and 1980s and into the 1990s was one of the finest land forces ever assembled, but simply hanging onto a lighter, smaller version of that force for the future is not going to work. The Army leadership that led the downsizing in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 was thoroughly professional—dispassionate, forceful, and direct. We need the same sort of resolve today, toward the end that the Army must change itself because it cannot simply be what it was and still be relevant to this new and complex world emerging. But at the same time, the Army must serve the indispensable function of holding together the European continent, which right now is somewhat adrift in thinking about its security requirements.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

QUESTION. In view of the perceived aversion to casualties on the part of the American public, is it any longer realistic to contemplate our involvement in hostilities where blood is likely to be shed?

Dr. Hamre. I was struck by the consensus that existed during the Kosovo operation. The skeptics believed that as we worked our way into the campaign, we had perhaps 2 or 3 days worth of public support. They were wrong. Even before

the CNN cameras galvanized the world with the pictures of the terrible refugee exodus, which strengthened public resolve, the Alliance leadership was quite solid. They realized that there was an enormous amount at risk if the Alliance fell apart. The necessity for Alliance cohesion will thus lend backbone, even in the face of casualties.

With regard to our own position at home, when the situation is serious and there is a strong consensus, America will go to war fast and will accept casualties. The perception that America is willing to fight only so long as nobody dies is wrong—if war were to break out today in Korea, we'd fight like hell. We'd take lots of casualties, but we wouldn't give up until we won. I'm absolutely convinced of that. But in a contemplated military action not deeply supported by the American people, if we proceed despite that lack of broad-based support, we then have to conduct the war in a way that avoids undermining whatever fragile consensus that does exist to carry it out. And therein might be the basis of the criticism that America is not prepared to go to war anymore. When we as a nation are absolutely convinced that it's in our interest to do so, we will fight. And it doesn't have to be oil we're fighting over. We'll fight for ideas. We did that in Kosovo. What made Kosovo so hard was that we had never developed a profound consensus among our political leadership over the Balkans at any time during the last 6 years. The crisis in Bosnia developed quickly, and the military did such an efficient job there that we never had to enter the crucible of public debate and consensus-building on why we were there and what we were fighting for. We will need to do better in the future.

QUESTION. Why should the United States underwrite European security in the face of European prosperity and its refusal to spend more on defense?

Dr. Hamre. We have a mixed picture. I think there is basic stability in the European defense budgets. They ought to be growing, but at least they aren't being slashed. They are effectively eroding, however, because the purchasing

power of their defense investments is badly undercut by the structural impediments. We in the United States spend four times as much each year on research and development (R&D) than all of Europe combined. The European investment is further eroded by having stovepipe establishments that have to be resourced in every country. We're not immune to that. We have an Army, Navy, and Air Force. We have an awful lot of inefficiencies in the United States, too. But clearly there is a reduction of the value of the annual input into R&D in Europe because it's feeding the beast rather than buying new knowledge. Europe has to come to grips with that problem. It would be much better if the United States and its European allies could jointly tackle the R&D problem. We'll always have a sizable defense budget, and we'll always be able to build a force. But our defense industrial base is now so narrow that we can't generate adequate R&D competition to underpin optimum force modernization. It would be best to tackle that problem on a transnational basis, but I'm not optimistic that we'll be able to pull that off in the present environment.

QUESTION. Speaking of the power of an idea as opposed to selfish interests as a clarion call for action, we all recall that in November 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and the people of that city celebrated with an all-night party in the streets. But we should also recall that earlier in that year, during the summer months of June through August, something else happened that was tremendously inspiring. Young men and women, clothes on their backs and carrying their babies, walked out of East Germany and headed west, all in the face of real hazards and an uncertain future. Doesn't this exodus illustrate the power of an idea?

Dr. Hamre. To share in your recollections, do you remember when things were starting to fall apart in early 1989, and the Hungarian government announced that it would no longer stop those who came from East Germany? That it would let them emigrate to the west? Almost overnight, 800 East Germans showed up at the West German Embassy in Budapest, posing a major crisis. They

had to be gotten out, so the Hungarian government rented a train bound for West Germany and took them out—I remember CNN was following the train across the frontier. When the train got to Frankfurt, a CNN reporter interviewed a young couple, with the woman holding a baby. The reporter asked all the typical inane questions. Aren't you tired? Aren't you hungry? Wasn't this a terrible trip? Do you know what you're going to do? All this kind of stuff. At the end of it, the reporter asked, "Is there anything else you'd like to say?" The young German father said, "Yes, there is something I'd like to say. I would like to thank America for keeping a place in the world that is free." That simple but eloquent statement by the young German captured perfectly what America had been doing for 50 years—holding up the beacon of freedom for the world's oppressed. Unfortunately, our post-Cold War generation lacks an equally compelling vision. But the flame is still there, even if it now burns less brightly, and it becomes the task of Americans everywhere to nurture that flame, to brighten the beacon of freedom for those less fortunate throughout the world.

ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 1

1. The European Union, for example, seems to be talking seriously about putting together a rapid-reaction corps of 50,000-60,000 troops, along with supporting aircraft and warships. See "EU Pursues Its Military Plans," *The Sentinel*, Carlisle, PA, January 23, 2000, p. A8.

CHAPTER 2

THE ROLE OF U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE

Wesley K. Clark

With NATO having just celebrated its 50th birthday, with the 10th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall now behind us, and with NATO's historic coercive campaign against Serbia now rapidly becoming grist for the military historians' mill, the time seems right to pause and take stock of where the NATO Alliance stands and where it is headed, with particular attention to the American role. In this chapter, I shall address six broad topics: the importance of Europe, security challenges facing NATO as it enters the new century, the state of the NATO Alliance today, Operation ALLIED FORCE, lessons from the recent Balkan conflicts, and winning in the 21st century.¹

THE IMPORTANCE OF EUROPE

The figures speak volumes. U.S. trade with Europe, amounting to over \$250 billion annually, produces over three million domestic jobs. U.S. companies employ three million people in Europe. One in 12 factory workers in the United States is employed by a European Union (EU) firm operating in this country, of which there are some 4,000. Half of the world's goods are produced by the United States and the EU. Ninety percent of humanitarian aid dispensed throughout the world comes from the United States and the EU. Companies from the EU form the largest investment block in 41 U.S. states. Fifty-six percent of U.S. foreign investment occurs in Europe. Europe buys 30 percent of U.S. exports. We should note too the large oil and gas reserves in the North Sea and particularly in the Caspian basin that provide a strategic hedge against disruption of supplies from the Middle East.

What these figures reveal is the enormous degree of economic interdependence between Europe and the United States. The economic ties are complemented and reinforced, of course, by political, cultural, and diplomatic ties of long standing. The unity of vision and purpose shared by Europe and the United States provides enormous leverage as these partners act in concert to encourage peace and prosperity throughout the world. Thus the maintenance of political and economic stability in Europe remains in the forefront of America's national interests.

As a result of those interests, we have continued to maintain a strong military presence in Europe, though it is a far cry from the size of the U.S. Seventh Army at the end of the Cold War, which amounted to 17 or 18 brigade equivalents. So far as force structure is concerned, we have two mechanized divisions in Germany, an airborne brigade in Italy, a brigade-size special forces unit, and assorted Reserve and National Guard personnel. The Air Force has two-plus fighter wings distributed in Germany, Italy, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, while the Navy maintains NATO-assigned aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean much of the time as well as a Marine Expeditionary Unit afloat. The numbers come to 65,000 personnel for the Army, 34,000 Air Force, 10,000 Navy and Marines, and 3,500 reserves, all embraced within a budget of some four billion dollars.

U.S. forces in Europe, though deeply interrelated to the NATO command structure, are not exclusively and automatically dedicated to NATO. The distinction is achieved through the maintenance of two separate command structures—the United States European Command (EUCOM) for U.S. forces and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) for NATO commands—with dual-hatted commanders for several principal elements within the two structures (see Figure 1). For example, the commander of EUCOM also serves as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) within NATO. The commander of U.S. Navy Europe (NAVEUR)

also commands Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) in NATO. The commander of U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) is in Bosnia serving as commander of NATO's stabilization force (SFOR).




Figure 1. U.S. European Command and NATO Command.

EUCOM serves as the backbone for many elements of NATO, but the United States achieves additional leverage through its command of other national forces via the device of dual-hatting. All in all, the United States is making a preponderant contribution to the NATO Alliance.

SECURITY CHALLENGES FACING NATO AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY—AND BEYOND

We remain in a period of danger. Unlike those who believed that the end of the Cold War marked the end of serious security challenges, NATO's statesmen realized immediately that we had not after all reached the end of history. Other security problems were emerging, as they always have over the course of time, and simple prudence demanded that they be prepared for. But the probability of occurrence of particular kinds of conflict is different today than it was during the Cold War. The probability of local

instabilities and insurgencies was quite high during the Cold War, with the chances for intra-failed-state conflict, regional conflict, conventional war, and the ultimate horror—nuclear war—declining rather precipitately as one moved toward the more violent end of the spectrum of conflict. But in today's security milieu, lacking the superpower polarity that often served to impose tense order in a confrontational world, intra-failed-state and regional conflicts are now joining with local instabilities and insurgencies to define the most likely forms of armed conflict. Our task is to deal with these dangers successfully, while preventing further movement toward the most serious manifestations of war.

Looking further down the road, we find other security challenges emerging. Regional instability such as we are seeing today in the Balkans will continue to be a problem and indeed may well intensify. The rapid proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—particularly chemical and biological—is becoming of paramount concern. Transnational threats—refugee movements, terrorism, criminal activity, environmental issues, scarcity of resources—are shouldering forward, demanding the attention of defense planners. The failure of democracy and liberal reform in states of the former Soviet Union could also pose dangerous security issues.

THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE TODAY

In the face of such an evolving security environment, NATO has continuously adjusted its strategic concepts so as to remain current and relevant. NATO's present strategic concept, agreed upon at the Washington summit in April 1999, represents an evolutionary adaptation of post-Cold War policy. Its hallmarks are:

- Broader appreciation of what constitutes security interests;
- Emphasis upon deterrence and rapid response;

- A technological imperative;
- Adoption of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.

The revised strategic concept reflects a broad appreciation of security interests, recognizing that security is not the same thing as defense. Though we must have collective defense as the foundation of security, members understand that events adjacent to or near Alliance countries can have decided impacts upon NATO security itself.

Deterrence remains important. Though we have no nation as adversary at this time, it is vital to retain the means to deter the outbreak of conflict wherever it can affect security within the Alliance. We recognize also the essentiality of being able to respond militarily in rapid fashion, not only within the borders of NATO countries but also without. Accordingly, we are placing increasing emphasis on rapid-reaction forces.

Technological advancement, of course, has never moved faster than it is moving today. Technology offers challenges as well as opportunities, however, for it is not easy to keep the national militaries within the Alliance at the cutting edge of modernization and also interoperable with each other. It is important for the European pillar of the Alliance to do more in this regard.

In sum, NATO's strategic vision has evolved from a single-minded focus on the threat from the east, as prevailed during the Cold War, to a European Security and Defense Identity, more expansive in concept and focused on no identified enemy. This is what both Europe and the United States want. It is time to halt the reduction of resources dedicated to defense—the so-called peace dividend—and face up to the reality that in this still dangerous world security never comes cheap.

Though the Alliance has no standing enemy, it will in the ebb and flow of events find its attention fixed at times on a

particular nation or region. Such is the case today, with the former Yugoslavia having already spawned two conflicts that demanded NATO's intervention and with the still unsettled nature of events there showing every promise of requiring long-term Alliance involvement.

In Croatia (see map at Figure 2) we have a state attempting to become a democracy, living with the aftermath of war, facing elections in late 1999, governed by a hard-line party, and headed by a president whose health problems have continued to inhibit his coming to grips with the need for democratization in his country. In Bosnia, we still have 30,000 NATO and associated troops on the ground. A three-member rotating presidency is in place, representing the Bosnian, Croat, and Serb constituencies. Encouragingly, it held together despite the enormous stresses imposed by the war in Kosovo. Refugees are returning, though some remain displaced. The armed forces are increasingly under control. A recent Balkan stability summit brought progress in terms of calls for reductions of those forces. But we cannot yet claim true reconciliation in Bosnia, even though the people there are growing accustomed to the taste of peace thanks to NATO's work in the region.

Montenegro, which was drawn reluctantly into the conflict in Kosovo, remains a province of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The president, Milo Djukanovic, governs an uneasy coalition, with one major coalition partner striving for independence while he himself works to remain within the Serbia-Montenegro federation even as he attempts to wrest concessions from Belgrade.

Albania, though not a part of the former Yugoslavia, was caught up in the spreading Balkan problem. Its government collapsed in early 1997, leading to intervention by Italian forces to restore stability. After withdrawal of the Italians in the fall of 1997, the viability of the government remained tenuous. Then came the Kosovo crisis and the consequent flood of refugees across the border into Albania. The



Figure 2. Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Surrounding Region.

Albanians urgently appealed to NATO for assistance, which was provided. Adjacent to Albania is Macedonia, formerly a part of Yugoslavia, but now a free and democratic state. U.S. troops have been on the ground there since 1993 as part of a United Nations (UN) stabilization and security mission, which correctly anticipated the subsequent flow of events. Macedonia, despite the very real centrifugal political forces loosed in the country, managed to hold together during the Kosovo conflict.

Finally, of course, there are Serbia and Kosovo. In Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic remains in power. The economy is devastated as a result of his exposing the nation's instruments of production to NATO attacks. The people are restive and concerned about the winter season now finally receding. Milosevic is still doing his best to keep his hands on the reins of power. At the center of all the furor is Kosovo itself. We have there today over 30,000 NATO troops on the ground, along with a small Russian contingent. Refugees have flowed back in the largest spontaneous reverse diaspora since the post-World War II era. The people have returned, and the sorting-out process is now proceeding.

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE

That is the situation in the Balkans as it exists today. But let's now flash back to the spring of 1998 to see how NATO conceptualized its response to the emerging conflict in Kosovo. Planning proceeded along the following strategic axes:

- Coercive air campaign;
- Isolation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
- Humanitarian relief to refugees;
- Continued implementation of the Dayton Accords.

We had recognized on March 24, 1999, when the first bomb dropped on Yugoslavia, that an air campaign in isolation would not be enough to deter Slobodan Milosevic. We also had to impose diplomatic and physical isolation on the federal government of Yugoslavia, letting it know there would be no succor from any quarter and that the country would be exposed to the full brunt of NATO's power. We also had to make provision for humanitarian relief to refugees, a lesson learned from Bosnia. Finally, we had to keep the lid on in Bosnia itself, continuing to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement signed back on November 21, 1995. Thus the NATO headquarters was extraordinarily busy with these multiple tasks.

Our plan was to mount a steadily escalating series of steps designed to increase pressure on Milosevic in order to secure heightened diplomatic, psychological, and physical leverage. The first step was to be persuasion—diplomacy backed by threat (discussion of the air threat occurred in June 1998 followed by issuance of the air threat in October 1998). The second step was to be coercion—diplomacy backed by force (the air campaign commenced on March 24, 1999, with a ground threat possible in June 1999). The third step, should it prove necessary, would be forcible territorial seizure and securing by ground operations as backed by appropriate diplomacy.

The actual implementation of the diplomacy as contemplated above proved most instructive. We tried to persuade President Milosevic not to use military forces against the Kosovar rebels. He wasn't persuaded. Accordingly, in October 1998, NATO issued an activation order for a forthcoming air campaign. General Klaus Naumann, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General, and I as SACEUR traveled to Belgrade to confer with Milosevic on several occasions. On October 25, we issued the air threat directly to him, and it resulted in a respite of some 2 to 4 months in the Kosovo fighting.

After Milosevic had signed off on his promises to NATO, he offered us brandy and we sat around talking in a philosophical vein. He said, "We know how to deal with the problem of these Albanians. We've done this before." We asked where. "In the Drenica region in central Kosovo in 1946," he told us. We asked what the solution was. He said right out: "We killed them. We killed them all. It took several years, but eventually we killed them all. And then we had no problem."

After this chilling conversation, we knew that the clock was ticking. Sure enough, by March of the next year we were into a campaign of coercion—diplomacy backed by force. The intent was to—

- Attack, disrupt, and degrade current Serb military operations;
- Deter any further aggressive Serb actions;
- Degrade Serb military potential.

It was vitally important that the air campaign—fittingly called Operation ALLIED FORCE—be a success. Accordingly, we established several goals to satisfy our notion of success, calling them measures of merit:

- Avoid losses;

- Impact Serb forces in Kosovo (and associated targets throughout FRY);
- Minimize collateral damage;
- Maintain alliance cohesion.

Each of these goals was important. It was paramount that we avoid losses. Why? Because in an air campaign you don't want to lose aircraft. When you start to lose these expensive machines the countdown starts against you. The headlines begin to shout, "NATO loses second aircraft," and the people ask, "How long can this go on?" The answer had to be, "It can go on indefinitely, whatever time it takes to compel Milosevic to comply with the will of the international community." But all realized it could not go on indefinitely if we were suffering a succession of aircraft losses. Moreover, the same argument applied if we were losing air crewmen. Thus the extraordinary steps to avoid losses.

So far as the other measures of success were concerned, obviously we had to hit, hurt, and inhibit the Serb forces in Kosovo because Serbian actions there were the *casus belli* itself. Of course, we wanted to strike hard at the strategic and infrastructure targets throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but the attacks on these fixed targets were relatively easy compared to gripping the tactical forces themselves. It was unheard-of for an air component to wage a full and successful tactical campaign against fielded land forces without benefit of a ground component. We knew it would be a huge challenge, particularly given the topographical and vegetative features of the terrain, which lent themselves to enemy cover, concealment, and camouflage.

The minimization of civilian casualties and damage to civilian structures and property—whether Serb or Kosovar—was very high on our priority list. This was so for both humanitarian and political reasons. Any lack of discrimination between legitimate military targets and

off-limits civilian areas would have undercut our efforts to explain what we were doing and maintain public support.

The final measure of success, no less important than the others, was the maintenance of Alliance cohesion. In planning and waging Operation ALLIED FORCE, it was necessary to consider the views and sensitivities of Alliance members because a united effort over the long haul was an essential precondition for achievement of military and political goals.

Operation ALLIED FORCE consisted of two simultaneous air lines of operation—a strategic attack on Serbia itself and a tactical attack in Kosovo. The strategic attack targeted Serbia's integrated air defenses, command and control structures, Yugoslav army and Ministry of Interior forces, war-sustaining infrastructure and resources, and military supply routes. In Kosovo, the attacks were designed to degrade, isolate, and interdict Serbian forces.

From the inception of the air campaign, it was our intention to make it serious, sustained, and intensifying. Between kick-off on March 24 and termination on June 9, the total number of aircraft employed almost tripled—from 366 to 912 (Figure 3). These figures would have risen still further had Milosevic not capitulated when he did. Early in the campaign, reporters kept asking us how many sorties and how many strikes were launched, showing an almost endless fascination with the numbers. To accommodate them, we kept tabs. The final figures revealed over 37,000 sorties, with almost 11,000 strike sorties flown and over 23,000 bombs and missiles launched (Figure 4).

Looking at the number of strike sorties as they were distributed over the course of the campaign, we see that the manned aircraft strike sorties increased from about 100 per day in the beginning to close to 500 on some days in the latter stage (Figure 5). The figures varied day by day depending on weather conditions and the nature of the targets. We used a lot of cruise missiles early in the

	Beginning 24 March	Ending 10 June
Strike	121	355
Air to Air	561	20
Reconnaissance/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles	26	72
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses/Jamming	55	74
Tanker	66	228
Other Support	42	63
Total Aircraft	366	912
Cruise Missile Platforms	10	17

Figure 3. Growth of Air Assets

Total Sorties Flown.....	37,465
Strike Sorties Flown.....	10,808
Ordnance Expended	
• 23,000+ Bombs and Missiles	
• 35% Precision-Guided Munitions	
• 329 Cruise Missiles	

Figure 4. Air Operations Snapshot.

campaign when the targets were more suitable, but discontinued their use later. Out of all the devastation from the air implicit in the foregoing numbers, there were only 20 incidents of significant collateral damage. I don't believe any other air campaign in history achieved this degree of precision.

The air staffers who planned those missions and the airmen who flew them did an absolutely superb job. The




Figure 5. Strike Sorties by Date.

men and women who flew our aircraft daily into the skies over Yugoslavia are the real heroes of this campaign. They are for the most part anonymous. Their identities were kept confidential to avoid putting their families at risk. But they flew over Yugoslavia day after day, night after night, facing continuous antiaircraft missile fire. Despite the fact that none of our pilots lost their lives, there were numerous close encounters in which aircraft were banged up and almost lost. It was a tough fighting environment, and the success of our pilots is a great testament to their skill and courage.

We need to ask ourselves why the war ended when it did. Why did Milosevic toss in the towel? The best explanation is that he had finally run out of options. Early on, he had any number of hopes. Maybe NATO would not muster the will to bomb despite its threats to do so. If NATO did send bombers, maybe he could shoot them down in politically telling numbers. Or maybe the bombs wouldn't be accurate and he could absorb them. Maybe he could embarrass the Alliance so that domestic support would erode and cohesion disappear. Maybe other nations would rally to his side and provide assistance. Maybe he would defeat the Kosovar forces and all resistance would collapse. Maybe he could destabilize the entire region and NATO would be too distracted to focus on Serbia. But in the end all those

maybes came to naught. The only option left to him was to accept NATO's conditions. He waited until the last possible time to accept those conditions and still have a chance to retain power. That was his cold calculation, explaining why—despite telling General Naumann and me in January 1999 that keeping Kosovo was more important than saving his head—in the end he gave up Kosovo in an attempt to save his head.

LESSONS FROM THE BALKAN CONFLICTS

What did we learn from the Kosovo experience? First, it became apparent that rapid, sustained, and detailed planning was an absolute must. As mentioned earlier, starting in the spring of 1998 NATO headquarters commenced detailed planning, constantly updating provisional plans in the light of breaking events, and it continued such work at a feverish pace virtually non-stop through the end of September. Second, we learned that contrary to expectations, NATO even in post-Cold War Europe must maintain *real* warfighting capabilities: rapid reaction forces with deployable command and control; Alliance intelligence fusion; air-ground reconnaissance; all-weather, full-spectrum engagement capabilities; and interoperable, survivable, sustainable forces.

In particular, intelligence had to be available, not just strategic warning indicators but hard data for immediate targeting. To accomplish this, we had to use air to conduct reconnaissance of the ground. The ideal instrument for this mission proved to be unmanned aerial vehicles, which we deployed and used effectively for the first time in combat. Also, we had to be able to engage the enemy, not just in the bright, clear weather conditions like those in the American southwest where U.S. forces train, but also in the soup, where visibility was poor or nonexistent. In short, Kosovo confronted NATO and the men and women who served in its forces with a real warfighting experience.

I'd also like to glance at a few of the lessons drawn from Bosnia, because what we've been doing in Bosnia for some time has relevance to our present task in Kosovo. Many have an impression of peacekeeping as consisting of soldiers patrolling along a cease-fire line, driving back and forth in jeeps while exuding good will to the locals. But the reality in Bosnia is quite different, presenting a far more complex picture than simple peacekeeping. By way of example, consider three vignettes: the Serb "rally" at Banja Luka; the seizure of Serb radio-television transmission towers; and an unfortunate incident involving returning Serbs at Drvar.

On September 6, 1997, just before the local Bosnian elections, the hard-line parties in the Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) announced a special Republika-wide "rally" for the election in Banja Luka. We knew that the gathering was more than a mere rally because the day before we had seized a cache of police uniforms and weapons. There was thus very good reason to believe that this so-called peaceful rally was in fact dedicated to overthrowing the moderate Serb Co-President, Biljana Plavsic. The situation presented a tricky military problem, because how can peacekeeping forces properly take action against what is represented as a democratic rally? The call had gone out for all "courageous and intelligent Serbs" to get on a bus, travel to Banja Luka, and be with their brothers—and get paid 200 to 400 Deutsche marks for the experience. From all over Bosnia, 250 busses loaded up and started to move.

In the meanwhile, as we worked to coalesce political opinion against the rally on the basis that it represented a threat to democracy and stability in Republika Srpska, we were able to delay the arrival of the busses using nonlethal means. We successfully fostered broad public sentiment that the rally was not only unnecessary but illegal and threatening as well. And so it came about that by about 6:00 p.m. on September 8, the rally was effectively banned by Bosnian Serb police.

The hard-line Serb leader Momcilo Krajisnik attempted to hold the rally anyway. He stood in the square with 400 supporters, surrounded by 1,500 hostile Serbs who supported the moderate Serb president Madam Plavsic, and was literally booted off the stage. He took refuge in a nearby hotel, and the next day Milosevic called me, saying, "You must protect his life." We asked, "Who's in the hotel with him?" Milosevic said, "Oh, just some armed guards and other people. But he is in danger, he is president, and he must be treated with respect." NATO thus found itself in the position of assisting and protecting the very same hard-line Bosnian Serb leader who had been a consistent opponent of NATO forces. The episode was the gravest defeat of radical Serb forces in the entire 5-year campaign, and it was inflicted by other Bosnian Serb forces assisted by NATO. The Banja Luka incident demonstrated that if peacekeeping forces have mobility, information superiority, interoperability, and sublethal means of engagement, they can win in situations where nobody even knows there's been a fight.

The second illustrative peacekeeping vignette from Bosnia relates to the disruptive influence of Serb radio and television. A few weeks after the incident in Banja Luka, Carlos Westendorp, the EU Peace Envoy and High Representative in Bosnia, called me and said, "You've got to help me with Serb radio-television—it's undercutting democracy." Under the authority provided by the North Atlantic Council, I spoke to Secretary General Javier Solana, and we agreed that we would seize control of the television transmission towers at Duga Niva, Udrigovo, Trebevic, and Leotar.

The planning began at 7:00 p.m. on the evening of September 30, 1997, in SFOR headquarters. The order to execute went out after midnight, and at 5:00 a.m. the next morning, Italian, Spanish, and U.S. forces moved out to take the towers, each of which was guarded by a small Serb contingent. We knew the routes and moved to each site with an overwhelming display of force, knocked on the door of the

security huts, and said simply, "Why don't you come out and join us for breakfast—we have some hot coffee." The Serbs looked at our tanks and armored personnel carriers, glanced at their puny AK-47s, and then said, "We'd love some hot coffee!" They walked away from the towers, and that was it. The operation attracted virtually no headlines but had a huge favorable impact in Bosnia. The key lessons were the need for rapid and flexible planning, interoperability, effective engagement capability, mobility, and survivability.

The final illustrative vignette from Bosnia occurred on April 24, 1998, even as the situation in Kosovo was heating up. It did not work out successfully like the earlier two. It was our policy to encourage all minority refugees to return to the home areas from which they had fled. In Drvar, a group of hard-line Croats decided they would get rid of the returning Serbs. Outside Croats, unfamiliar to us and the local authorities, infiltrated the town and gathered into an unruly crowd. They produced incendiary devices and proceeded to burn some 100 Serb homes plus several vehicles, moving along planned routes. The Canadian battalion responded, but only after the crowd had begun to leave. Lacking nonlethal capabilities, the battalion would have been unable to prevent the violence within acceptable limits of coercion.

The result was a huge setback for the refugee repatriation effort in Bosnia. It stopped the endeavor almost cold for 9 months, giving hard-line leaders on all sides new life and encouragement. In drawing lessons from the Drvar incident, we find affirmed the essentiality of local intelligence, sublethal engagement capability, interoperability, and rapid response, all of which were lacking or inadequate in this instance. NATO is engaged in a continuous process of analyzing its Balkan operations, drawing the relevant lessons and disseminating them through national channels. We will doubtless confront similar challenges again in the future.

On a more general level, a paramount lesson we derive from the Balkan experience is the incredible complexity of military operations. Every decision, every act, every event reverberates with tactical, operational, strategic, and political implications. The military commander must attend to all four. No matter how small or insignificant an event may seem in the traditional military sense, the commander will discover that in today's security milieu that minor event may suddenly become the object of consuming interest at the highest councils of state.

WINNING IN THE 21st CENTURY

Looking ahead into the next century, we see a growing need for rapid-reaction forces within the Alliance. Though we must retain main defense forces as a hedge against uncertainty—against the worst possible contingencies—we are going to have to acquire the tools to deal with the far more likely crisis and conflict scenarios outside of NATO territory. Thus there will be a strong new effort to strengthen the reaction forces in NATO member nations, forces that can be moved quickly to deal with local instabilities and insurgencies, failed-state situations, and regional conflicts in areas that can affect NATO security.

At the Washington summit, NATO members adopted the Defense Capabilities Initiative, conceived to produce reaction forces that can respond to any possible challenge by overmatching the opponent in size, technology, readiness, and training. These reaction forces would possess information superiority, interoperability, sustainability, broad-spectrum engagement capability, survivability, and mobility. This is what it will take to win NATO's battles in the next century, and I believe we're on track to obtain such capabilities. NATO's force goals and force planning process, guided by the concept of a European Security and Defense Identity, will produce the forces we need to implement NATO's new strategic concept.

Clearly, European security remains vital to U.S. interests, and we can never safely remain indifferent to security in that region out of a misbegotten yearning to return to the isolationism of the 1930s. In pursuing its policy of engagement, it is critical for the United States to work through NATO so as to benefit from the huge leverage that such association brings. However, it is inevitable and proper that both NATO and the NATO-U.S. relationship continue to evolve over time. Evolution and adaptation of the comfortable security fixtures of the past should be no cause for concern, for through such prudent adjustments we equip ourselves to confront the flux of events that time shall surely bring.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

QUESTION. I'd like to ask a question not about the Balkan states but rather about the Baltic states. A member of the U.S. State Department who was recently in the Baltic states is reported to have said that their membership in NATO is practically inevitable. If that took place, how would you uphold NATO's treaty obligations to protect those states from armed attack (North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5), and would that involve specifically the deployment of U.S. and NATO troops and/or nuclear weapons?

General Clark. I'm not going to speculate on hypothetical or prospective military activities in the form asked, but I will make a couple of points in response to your question. First, the Alliance leaders have said that the door to further NATO accession remains open. The Baltic countries are among those earnestly seeking to join NATO. I was in Lithuania and Latvia recently and had very good consultations with their leadership. They are making real headway in terms of transforming and creating armed forces that could be interoperable with NATO. NATO's policy in the past has been to first be sure that democratic conditions are met before NATO membership is granted. The Baltics are doing quite well in that regard. We've also

said that we want to help them through the membership action plan to become interoperable, and they are working in that direction also. But the decision to extend invitations for membership is a political decision which I couldn't comment on. Nor could I comment on any hypothetical Article 5 operations or deployments except to note that in the case of the accessions of the first three countries—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—we've said that there would not be a need for NATO forward deployments there, certainly not nuclear weapons. Nor would there be any large NATO headquarters in those countries.

We're not trying to re-create the division of Germany and move it further east. It is of fundamental importance to understand what NATO leaders have always told Klaus Naumann and me: NATO is first and foremost a political alliance, not a military alliance. It has a broad program of outreach at multiple levels to provide assurance and stability throughout Europe. It does this through partnerships for peace, through scientific exchanges, and through conferences, dialogue, and multiple forms of cooperation. It extends assurances of security, it provides hope, it provides a basis for people in these formerly turbulent regions of eastern Europe to believe that in the future they will achieve the stability needed to attract international investment in their countries. This stability and security form the essential bedrock for all the other reforms, hopes, and dreams that these societies have. Thus NATO is a political alliance first and foremost, with a military component among many others.

QUESTION. I'd like to ask about Task Force Hawk, the U.S. Apache helicopter and support contingent. According to the newspapers, the United States provided Task Force Hawk to NATO, but never gave it release authority for employment. Can you comment on countries providing forces, but then not allowing them to be used.

General Clark. Every country that provides forces to NATO normally places conditions on their use. In this case, the decision was made to deploy with a possibility later of employment. That decision to employ was never made, and thus the authority was not passed to NATO.

Task Force Hawk, however, got there in a very effective way, even though it didn't meet the early expectations for timelines that had been publicly announced. Originally, Task Force Hawk was to be deployed into Macedonia, but at the very time when we made the decision to deploy, the well-publicized wave of refugees began flooding into Macedonia, producing a potentially destabilizing humanitarian crisis there as well as in Albania. The decision was then made to shift its location from Macedonia to Albania. This necessitated a much larger force package because of the geography and other conditions in Albania. That increase in turn extended the deployment timelines. Our troops did an excellent job of moving and setting up on the airfield near Tirana.

Task Force Hawk made an enormous contribution to the outcome of the war. Its arrival on the ground signaled a real determination to succeed. The people and government of Albania immediately recognized it for what it was. Task Force Hawk represented the United States and NATO—they were visibly there in Albania with boots on the ground. As a result of that, the army of Albania continued to strengthen its performance, it moved to the frontier, it protected its own border. Moreover, it encouraged the people of Albania to deal pragmatically with the other problems in their country. It provided key intelligence and planning data as we moved into the final days of the air campaign. It was a superb effort.

We were all crushed by the tragic loss of our two Apache helicopter pilots who went down on a training mission in Albania. But I can't say enough for the character and the courage of the men and women of Task Force Hawk, who moved in there rapidly in a difficult environment, trained

up to speed in unfamiliar surroundings, and in that process made a profound contribution to the successful outcome of the campaign.

QUESTION. When the war in the Balkans began, many believed that air power would never win the war. But in retrospect, it appears to have done so. Judging from reports in the news media, a larger role for the Air Force is in the offing because of its mounting utility in winning wars. Are you willing to accept that the Air Force has now become our favorite tool for fighting wars?

General Clark. We know, first of all, that this wasn't really a war. We call it a war, and for the men and women who flew over Belgrade I guarantee you it was a war. But in terms of foregoing all hopes for a diplomatic outcome and instead simply crushing the enemy, no we didn't do that. We operated on multiple levels throughout this campaign. We isolated Milosevic, we stabilized the countries in the region, we kept the lid on in Bosnia, we applied pressure through the air campaign, we kept our NATO resolve intact. All along, we said we are winning, Milosevic is losing, and he knows it. He knew it because he couldn't touch our aircraft, he couldn't protect his equipment on the ground, and the end was obvious and inevitable. Ultimately, therefore, he conceded. But in an air campaign like this, there was never some specific criterion, some predictable level of damage, at which we were assured of attaining the desired result. Thus we always said that the air campaign was working, it was on track, but we wanted to be sure that we had the opportunity, if necessary, to do other things as well.

When I look at the campaign in retrospect, I see the tremendous contribution made by Task Force Hawk, the significant impact of the Kosovo Liberation Army in flushing out the Serbs during the last weeks of the campaign, and the effective use of air power. I thus believe the old rule is still the right rule—that it takes a balanced mix of capabilities to wage modern war and that these various capabilities must be exploited in differing degrees

and combinations depending on the specific political and military circumstances at hand. The result in Operation ALLIED FORCE demonstrates that we did exactly that.

QUESTION. How did you come up with the measures for success in gauging the success of Operation ALLIED FORCE?

General Clark. If you look at the measures of success—I prefer to call them measures of merit—you'll note that not one of the measures could be accomplished totally or absolutely, but only to a certain degree depending on the trade-offs we chose to accept. Are we doing enough to avoid friendly aircraft losses while still striking Serb forces effectively on the ground? Are we striking his infrastructure and forces on the ground hard enough or do we have to back off a little bit to minimize further collateral damage? If we're striking too hard, if we're causing too many problems, are we risking Alliance cohesion? All of these measures of merit were fundamentally at odds with each other, because the considerations in determining how to design the campaign and how to work it on a day-to-day basis are so difficult and complex. In retrospect, we made many calls that could have gone another way, but one of the things I learned a long time ago at the National Training Center is that there's no single best way, there's no single best plan. There are just two kinds of plans, two kinds of ways—those that might work and those that won't work. You have to pick a way that might work, and then you make it work. That's what NATO did.

QUESTION. Have you determined the cause of the loss of the Stealth bomber?

General Clark. An investigation has been accomplished, but I'm not at liberty to discuss the details of it here because Stealth is a classified platform. We have gone through the mechanics and we know pretty much what happened. We remain very confident in our equipment and we're very confident in our pilots. I want to say one more time in conclusion how proud all of us should be of the men and

women in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines who were there in the air and on the ground in this very ambiguous situation. They did a great job for our country and for NATO. They're the heroes of this campaign and I salute each and every one of them and will never forget them. I made trip after trip to Italy, Albania, and Macedonia, and it was an inspiration to meet our young troops, to witness the innovation, the positive attitude, the dedication, the determination to succeed. The pilots that flew over Kosovo and watched the burning and the mayhem everyday knew better than anybody else what this campaign was about. They were determined to succeed. And they did.

ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 2

1. This chapter, under the title "The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead," and without the question-and-answer section, appeared in *Parameters*, Vol. 29, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 2-14.

CHAPTER 3

STAYING IN EUROPE: A VITAL AMERICAN INTEREST

Klaus Naumann

To approach the question of America's future military presence in Europe, I shall begin with a brief glance at the situation as I see it today. True, the United States is the only superpower left—economically, politically, strategically, militarily—indeed, it is militarily stronger than ever. Washington is at present actively involved in conflicts in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. But despite such American power projection into overseas areas, despite American involvement in foreign political, economic, and military affairs, it remains, to quote Samuel Huntington, "A lonely superpower that can't do much alone." The United States needs a global partner who can act together with Washington as a global power. Such a new conception of partnership is required to deal with old and new challenges of the multipolar post-Cold War environment. The post-Cold War turmoil in the Balkans, the eternal Turkish-Greek-Cyprus crisis, the situations in the Middle East, India, and Pakistan, as well as a new Russian-Chinese rapprochement, are some of the hallmarks of this new world, and in responding to them alone the United States would find even its vaunted power stretched too thin.

The Chinese and Russian defense ministers now meet on a regular basis. Beijing's military procurement policy is undoubtedly favorable to Russian products. Former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in his visit to Delhi in December 1998 proposed a trilateral relationship among Russia, China, and India. The Chinese premier Zhu Rongji and Russian president Boris Yeltsin stressed during their meeting in February 1999 in Moscow the necessity of increasing political, economic, and military cooperation. They clearly expressed a preference for a multipolar world,

rejecting the idea of domination by the United States. These developments should be watched carefully. True, both Beijing and Moscow are weak at this time. But that might change in the next 10 to 15 years. I am sure it will change as far as China is concerned.

A complicating factor is that we shall be confronted with the simultaneous presence of three different forms of societies and their concomitant forms of war—pre-modern, modern, and post-modern. This is a new development suggesting that no single nation—not even the United States—can any longer pursue national security unilaterally. The multifaceted, multidirectional threats we face at the beginning of the third millennium will require responses by alliances. We will be confronted with nonstate actors who will use military weapons. We will see proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the most dangerous one, biological weapons. And we might even see opponents who use information warfare to paralyze our very vulnerable modern societies.

We are about to enter a world that will be less predictable and less stable than the bipolar world which we brought successfully to an end in 1989. And we will see a world containing another novelty: the United States of America, the only superpower, will be vulnerable to attacks by nonstate actors. Again, America will need a partner. But why should it be Europe, a continent striving to achieve unity but which is far from speaking with one voice. The selection of a strategic partner is based on a nation's strategic interest. Why is Europe important to the United States?

Europe is of strategic importance because three of the most important and difficult challenges at the beginning of the 21st century can be successfully tackled only if Europe and the United States cooperate more closely than ever before. These three challenges are, first, to manage Russia's weakness; second, to contain the new risks and the new reasons for conflict; and third, to halt the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction. Let us address each of these three challenges in turn.

First Russia. Russia's transformation is far from complete. At the moment, Russia is not yet a true democracy nor are there signs of lasting economic stability. The Russian elites still believe their country to be number two in the world, although their gross national product equals that of Denmark. They continue to believe military power can imbue Russia with global importance. Perhaps that is the reason for what I would call the coup of Pristina, where Russia without prior announcement landed a 200-man contingent in the wake of Operation ALLIED FORCE in order to forge a role in the Kosovo peacekeeping effort. They increasingly believe they must rely on nuclear weapons to compensate for their weakness. We have to deal with the wounded psyche of a continental power that failed to understand it was confronted by a military alliance called NATO. The Russians have wanted veto rights over NATO actions in Europe, and they had to learn during the Kosovo crisis that while NATO was willing to inform them of contemplated actions, it would not grant them any rights of co-decision. This stance will likely be maintained. No one can predict Russia's future with certainty. Its disintegration is as possible as its resurrection as a global player during the first half of the 21st century. The greater danger at this moment, however, is the disintegration of Russia.

We need to cooperate with Russia and give her assistance. To this end we need a coordinated European and American approach, which in my view could best be handled by NATO. The task is simply too big for either Europe or the United States acting alone. And without managing the Russian problem, we will never have stability in Europe, nor indeed in the world.

Challenge number two: we need to keep the new risks under control and prevent new forms of conflict. To that end we'll again need close U.S.-European cooperation. Two of

the most likely reasons for conflict at this time are mass human migrations and the shortage of water as a consequence of ever increasing populations. At the beginning of the 1980s, we had some 11 million refugees on our globe. Today we are approaching the 30 million mark. We learned in Kosovo how quickly refugees can be used to destabilize countries. According to a study commissioned by the United Nations, by the year 2050 approximately 25 percent of our world's population will suffer from a severe shortage of water. People have killed each other for lesser grievances than a shortage of water.

Confronted with these new risk-laden reasons for conflict, we have to work together to mitigate tensions and resolve grievances. People who have nothing to lose can easily be seduced by a ruthless regime. Neither the United States nor Europe can cope with this problem alone, since neither electorate has a keen interest in what they see as a remote and rather unlikely danger. The United States and Europe are the only players who realistically could hope to resolve such problems, and even then only by joining forces. To this end, we need a well-coordinated effort to keep regional instabilities from growing into global instability that could engulf us all.

Challenge number three: so far as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is concerned, we need a global effort. But such a comprehensive effort is practicable only if we execute it in a steady, incremental way, as is the present approach, rather than demanding sudden giant bounds. Most nations are simply not aware how urgent the problem is and thus will be unprepared to acquiesce in draconian solutions. It is particularly important to prevent what I would call "soft" proliferation, that is, the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states that hire dispossessed weapons scientists and engineers who carry blueprints for such weapons in the back of their minds. There is no hope of preventing any of the various forms of proliferation unless the United States and Europe take common action. What seems obvious is that Europe and the

United States need each other as partners to find any solution at all.

The three global challenges discussed above matter for both the United States and Europe. They require cooperation, not isolated approaches. Europe, of course, is not as militarily strong as it should be. But it is a reliable and by and large predictable partner. If the United States looks around at potential partners, it will not often find among them these qualifications—reliability and predictability. Furthermore, Europe is a partner who shares the same values as the United States, a rare quality among America's partners around the globe.

I conclude therefore that the European continent is still of strategic importance to the United States. Without Europe, there is little to no chance to keep the risks to America at a distance. And unless those risks are kept at a distance, the vulnerability of the United States will increase as well. On the opposite side—and let me be absolutely clear on this—without the United States in Europe, there is neither security nor stability in Europe itself. For quite a time to come, Europe cannot do without the American presence.

But there are other security interests at stake. Economically the United States still finds an important export market in Europe, a region in which American firms have invested considerable money and on which thousands of domestic jobs depend. The proposition also works in reverse, with Europe similarly dependent upon the United States. Europe and the United States need economic cooperation in order to remain competitive in the Asian market in the 21st century. America's economists know that better than its defense establishment does. They realize that Europe forms a gateway for the American economy to Eastern Europe, to Russia, and to the Central Asian countries ranging from Turkmenistan to Kazakhstan. These places are potentially areas where consumer goods may be in high demand if everything goes well. But business

will never invest there if security is lacking. American and European cooperation in enhancing such security could create the prerequisites for business investment in an emerging marketplace in this enormous region east of the NATO Treaty area.

Moreover, for Americans cooperation between the United States and Europe opens the door to the European Union (EU), securing for them a certain measure of influence on this organization, which is, after all, an economic competitor of the United States. A continuing American presence in Europe enhances such influence and allows both parties to better exploit the potential of the EU-U.S. declaration on trade.

But there are at least three other strategic reasons that speak for an ongoing American presence in Europe, the first being the geostrategic factor. The United States as a global and maritime power needs free access to the coastlines on both sides of the Atlantic. The Europeans offer control of the European coastline through America's participation in NATO and through their preparedness to host American contingents in Europe. Thus, if I understand my Alfred Mahan properly, an American presence in Europe is in America's strategic self-interest since it allows the United States to protect vital sea lines of communications.

Second, as I intimated earlier, we need to keep conflicts at a distance, which means that a European-American nexus can continue to serve as a launch pad for U.S. strategic deployments. Reflecting on the Balkan deployments and their promise of being prolonged, we note that the customary stationing of U.S. troops in Europe offers a cost-effective solution. It is far cheaper than temporary deployments from the States, and it is leveraged by the concomitant political influence.

Enhanced American influence beyond the Europe of the EU is a third strategic benefit of a continued U.S. presence. With American forces on the continent, the United States has a cost-effective solution for Partnership for Peace (PfP)

activities, which, by promoting unit-to-unit contacts between U.S. forces and those outside NATO, are one of the better investments in stability and outreach.

For all the foregoing reasons, I regard a strong American presence in Europe as serving U.S. strategic interests well, and as being indispensable for the Europeans. Moreover, there are potential benefits for other areas of the world since Europe is a true prerequisite of American global power projection capability. Let's be absolutely candid: without an American presence in Europe, the United States will never have the same clout in NATO as it has right now.

Taking into account that all future conflicts will require coalition efforts, a U.S. presence in Europe is an investment in winning the European support which after all is still the most reliable support the United States can get. But to maintain a substantial military presence in the absence of an existing threat is possible only if the Europeans are taking their fair share of the common defense burdens on their shoulders. The Europeans know that they have to do more. They will be slow in doing this, but they will do it in the end. Americans should not forget that the Europeans are doing something which is rarely mentioned in the familiar burden-sharing debates—they are investing a great deal in stabilizing the Eastern European and Russian situation.

The Europeans also know that military intervention requires the resoluteness to see it through once the decision is taken to go down that road. They harbor no illusion that you can win a war based on air power and technology alone. They know that in every conflict there is a need for boots on the ground at the end of the day. And they know that there will never be an intervention which you can guarantee will be casualty-free. The Europeans will in all likelihood remain slow in jumping on the military bandwagon during a crisis. But as soon as they are aboard, they will see it through. Kosovo has clearly shown that. After all, it was the

cohesion of NATO that made Milosevic and the Russians blink.

Europeans wish to remain America's partner, and they invite their friend to keep up its military presence in Europe, which secures its influence on the EU in a way second to none. The case for a continued robust U.S. presence in Europe is strong and the arguments are compelling. Let me review four points to underlie this statement. First, the American military presence in Europe means true forward defense of the United States and ensures the vital control of sea lines of communications. Second, the American presence strengthens a unique alliance, NATO, which is, after all, the only alliance in which all nations share the same values. Third, such a presence enhances American strategic flexibility, serving to extend U.S. global reach. And fourth, the American presence in Europe ties together the two most potent economic areas. This link will lead over time to increased cooperation and the reduction of competition. The result could be an economic global dominance that no one could challenge. An American presence on the continent best serves U.S. strategic interests and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

CHAPTER 4

AMERICA'S STANCE TOWARD EUROPE: MOVING AWAY FROM A NATO-CENTERED POLICY

Ted Galen Carpenter

Let's concede at the outset that Europe is still strategically important to the United States. But in what way or ways? Certainly not in the narrowest sense. After all, the United States, given its strategic nuclear deterrent and its other military and economic capabilities, could have survived Europe's fall during the Cold War. It would have been a far less pleasant world for the United States, but nonetheless the survival of a free and democratic Western Europe during that period was not the equivalent of the survival of the United States. It was important, it was not indispensable, and it is important to make such nuanced distinctions in today's world.

A few years ago, when he was Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke wrote that "the United States has become a European power" and that we should therefore act in that fashion.¹ On this issue, as on many others, Richard Holbrooke is dead wrong. The United States is not a European power. The United States is an external power that has some important European interests. That is a subtle but very important distinction. Because if Holbrooke were right, the United States, as a European power, indeed as the leading European power, would have to be as concerned as every other significant European power about every development that takes place anywhere in Europe. That is expecting far too much from us. It is not a sustainable policy.

We need to be more rigorous in our thinking about what America's important European interests are. Anyone can identify a number of them, but three stand out that have a

particularly enduring quality about them. The first is that we want no single power to dominate the continent. We do not want a European hegemon, particularly if that power is hostile to the United States. But, to be blunt about it, we do not want such a hegemon even if it were not hostile to the United States. In shorthand terms, we do not want a repetition of 1939 when Germany made a bid for continental domination. The second important interest is that Europe's great powers remain at peace with one another. The shorthand version of this interest is that we don't want any repetition of 1914. And a third important interest, in large part flowing from the other two, is that we want Europe to be a reasonably stable arena for American trade and investment. Thus we have to have a certain measure of stability on the continent. But again, nuance is important. What we're seeking here is general stability, macro-stability, if you will, on the continent. That should not be confused with the completely unattainable goal of micro-stability, where we seek stability everywhere on the continent, at all times, in every single country. That is simply not a feasible goal in any region as diverse as Europe.

I would be the first to concede that NATO as an institutional mechanism does secure America's important European interests, and that is a powerful argument for retaining the Alliance. But I would also argue that the NATO-centered policy has too many undesirable side effects for the United States in a post-Cold War strategic setting. To protect our important interests in Europe, we are increasingly being drawn into marginal or even irrelevant disputes and problems.

Henry Kissinger put this very well on the eve of NATO's military operations against Serbia. Expressing the frustration that more and more Americans share—in Congress, in the foreign policy community, and in the general public—he asked, "Why is it that the United States is expected to use military force to deal with a problem such as Kosovo?" He went on to say,

The European states should be able to manage that kind of problem, or problems of that magnitude, on their own. After all, we didn't expect the European members of NATO to send troops and to take a sizable portion of the responsibility to deal with the problem in Haiti.

The Europeans expected the United States to take care of that problem by itself. It was in our neighborhood, it wasn't a hugely serious problem, and Kissinger saw Kosovo as a European problem much in the same way that we saw Haiti as our problem.

Such considerations underscore another problem: a NATO-centered policy continues to encourage, as it did during the Cold War, an unhealthy dependency mentality on the part of the western European powers—what is often called “free-riding.” Unfortunately, the term free-riding has come to mean financial free-riding. European members in NATO underinvest in defense. They free-ride on the security guarantee provided by the United States.

But there's a more serious aspect of our NATO-centered policy. Such a dominant U.S. role virtually excludes the creation of effective alternative institutions to deal with secondary or tertiary security problems in Europe, the kinds of security problems that Henry Kissinger was talking about.

NATO, in that sense, is like a great oak tree that blocks out the sun for any other plants that might grow up in its shadow. We thus face a serious dilemma. How do we continue to secure America's important strategic interests in Europe without accepting the collateral baggage of involvement in marginal or even irrelevant disputes and problems? That requires an entirely new strategy: the vigorous downloading of responsibility for parochial disputes and secondary threats to the European Union (EU). It was one thing to argue during the Cold War that the West European powers were incapable of neutralizing the threat posed by a military superpower. It is quite another matter to suggest that a region that is as populous and

prosperous as the EU is incapable of dealing with problems posed by the likes of Slobodan Milosevic. But the basic lesson here is that incentives matter. We cannot expect the West European powers to undertake great initiatives and high responsibilities if the United States continues to allow them to off-load a good portion of those difficult responsibilities onto it. Again, incentives do matter.

I want to make it clear that I'm not proposing some new burden-sharing configuration. Disputes over burden-sharing ratios have represented the most sterile and phony debates in the entire trans-Atlantic security relationship. We have been down that road too many times over the past half century. The European members of NATO have made and broken so many promises of taking greater initiative, of assuming greater responsibility, of making a greater investment in defense, that no American policymaker can give future promises any degree of respect.

I am proposing nothing less than burden-shifting. That will entail a fundamental change in U.S. policy. I know there are a great many objections to moving away from a NATO-centered policy or, as some might even say, a NATO-only policy. One is that without the U.S. military presence, without U.S. leadership of NATO, we have the danger of renationalization of defenses throughout Europe, thus creating the same kind of instability, the same kinds of rivalry, that led to the two world wars. That's an improbable outcome, but one can't rule it out entirely. Josef Joffe, some 15 years ago, published an important article in *Foreign Affairs* titled "Europe's American Pacifier."² He was referring specifically to America's stabilizing role in preventing the renationalization of defense and the reemergence of national rivalries. He certainly had a point, for the America presence has had that stabilizing effect. But I've always wondered if Joffe recognized the implicit double meaning of his title. After all, a pacifier is something we give an infant, and as a parent I can attest that some infants cling to that pacifier as a security mechanism long after they need to do so. They will never voluntarily relinquish it, and I

think that is the problem we're facing in the trans-Atlantic relationship.

Another reason often heard for maintaining the current structure of the trans-Atlantic security relationship is that America's leadership of NATO and its presence in Europe give the United States important leverage in an array of other issues, particularly economic issues. That belief is widespread, but what is striking is the lack of any tangible evidence for it. I have challenged defenders of that proposition time and again to cite even a couple of specific examples in which the U.S. security presence and security leadership role caused the Europeans to make major concessions on political or economic issues when it was not manifestly in their own best interest to do so. I always get this deafening silence from the proponents of the status quo.

On the other hand, one can cite many examples where our leverage proved to be minimal to nonexistent, whether it was trade with Cuba, the embargo against Iran, or what have you, with the Europeans charting their own policies based on their own wishes and their own interests in the face of American opposition. I'm not suggesting that the European refusals to accede to U.S. wishes were wrong. In the case of Cuba, for example, their approach is arguably much more intelligent than the approach adopted by the United States. But the point is simply that there is very little if any evidence of effective U.S. leverage. If we want a structure that will truly protect our important European security interests without making the United States the babysitter of the Balkans or the future babysitter of the Caucasus, then we need to move away from a NATO-centered policy.

For conceptual clarity, our first step must be to distinguish the issue of the existence of NATO and U.S. membership in NATO, on the one hand, from the issue of a continued U.S. military presence in Europe, on the other hand. Though they tend to merge in the minds of many observers, these are two separate issues. When NATO was

created in 1949, not only was there no expectation that the United States would have a permanent military presence in Europe, there were explicit promises given to the U.S. Senate and the American people that there would be no permanent military presence because it would not be needed. If the Truman Administration and the architects of NATO believed that those were separate issues in 1949, during one of the worst periods of the Cold War, then surely they are separate issues in a post-Cold War strategic setting.

In moving away from a NATO-centered policy, the United States must seek to create a more narrowly focused and informal security relationship between itself as one contractual party and the EU as the other contractual party. That kind of security relationship would serve as an insurance policy against the rise, if that should happen, of a serious mutual security threat. Right now one does not exist. A possible model for the kind of U.S.-EU arrangement broached here would be the NATO of 1949, a security institution in which the United States maintained membership, but did not provide a routine military presence.

Defenders of the current system will decry the loss of benefits accruing from NATO's present integrated command and force structure. But this structure was created to meet a very specific threat, namely, a powerful military force with forward-deployed forces. Europe was in a perpetual state of crisis, confronting an expansionist great power. Such is not the strategic setting today, nor is it the prospective strategic setting for the foreseeable future. Therefore, a more circumscribed, narrowly focused, and informal security arrangement makes sense.

In short, we need a new security relationship that allows the United States to attend to the possible emergence of a serious mutual security threat without requiring it to undertake burdens and responsibilities that have little to do with its own vital security interests. I am baffled as to why

the United States seems bent upon setting itself up in the Balkans as a powerbroker in the mold of the old Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Such a role should appeal only to a masochist, and undertaking it is certainly not essential for the security and well-being of the United States. Furthermore, over the long haul the undertaking is unsustainable.

The American people are skeptical about our current posture in Europe, to put it mildly. The first time we encounter substantial casualties, support in the Congress and in the public is likely to evaporate. At that point, policymakers would need to worry about the extent of the backlash. Such a backlash could carry over to wanting to reject the overall security relationship with Europe. That is the danger that those who cling to the status quo are courting.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 2, March-April 1995, p. 38.
2. Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 34, Spring 1984, pp. 64-82.

CHAPTER 5

EUROPE AS A STRATEGIC STAGING BASE FOR 21st CENTURY STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Toward the end of 1995, I was privileged to launch and then participate in, for some 2 and 1/2 years, the Army's so-called Army After Next (AAN) Project, which sought to define the shape and character of landpower beyond the year 2010 and to investigate two of the principal factors that cause styles of war to change—technology and geostrategy. We had some powerful tools to help us hypothesize what conflict might look like out beyond 2010, including both tactical and strategic war games and numerous conferences. AAN war games were conducted at Fort Leavenworth and Carlisle Barracks, and because of the complexity were extremely difficult to do. The Army's great doctrinal revolution had occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s at the operational level, and that was difficult enough. But now we were attempting to reestablish the tenets of landpower during warfare at the next higher level.

We conducted a series of exercises using force on force in free-play scenarios. It is really challenging to replicate National Training Center exercises in the computer-based simulations of Collins Hall at the Army War College, but we did it four times.

Collaterally, in conducting a historical inquiry into the changing cycles and patterns of war, we observed that war has mutated from wars of religion to wars of kings to wars of nations to wars of ideology, and so forth. Increasingly, it became apparent that the fall of the Soviet empire might foster a new era of wars characterized by ethnic and cultural conflict. Accordingly, we postulated a clash in the year 2020 involving a newly emergent hegemonic power in central

Asia seeking to reestablish ethnic and cultural dominance over a small country in southeastern Europe. The hegemonic power aimed to achieve its strategic and operational objectives quickly—that is, to put forces on the victim's ground, disperse them, and then begin a process of cultural transformation in that country before the United States could project forces into the region and initiate an effective response.

We also made a series of visits, an intellectual odyssey if you will, to representatives of all the major armies around the world island. For my part, I spent almost 2 years doing this, enjoying an opportunity to conduct searching discourse with the leaders of most of the armies in eastern and central Asia. Based upon impressions gleaned from my visit and similar visits by other AAN Project team members, we formulated a general outline of what the nature of conflict might be out to the year 2025 and beyond. It tended to confirm our earlier suspicions, based upon historical investigation, that the most likely causes for conflict during that period would be ethnic and cultural in nature.

It seemed to us that such conflicts would arise along those historical borders separating traditionally antagonistic economic, religious, ethnic, national, or cultural groupings. The territories of such disputants are analogous to geological tectonic plates, colliding against and ultimately riding over or sinking under adjacent plates in an eternal friction of heat, strife, and violence. Such collisions have been the occasion of major wars for the last 5,000 years. To borrow Samuel Huntington's famous fault line analogy ("The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993), it seemed to us that the greatest potential for serious combat during our time frame would occur along these traditional fault lines.

History clearly shows that when the artificial caps that suppress or sublimate ethnic and cultural conflict are removed, the actors revert to this approach and conflict resumes. Thus it seemed to us that the maintenance of

security and stability along these fault lines would depend on the ability of political structures to manage the inevitable tensions by means short of war. In any event, we were certain we knew where tensions were most likely to flare into outright hostilities. That is why we chose southeastern Europe as the setting for our first war game. It happens that this particular region marks the intersection of not two but three fault lines—Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and Western Christianity.

In talking to the potential major actors, it seemed to us that we were seeing an almost spontaneous process of change well under way among many of the armies around the world island. We observed, first of all, a shedding of Cold War baggage and attitudes. I was struck particularly by how quickly armies of the world are relinquishing major weapon systems and readjusting their style of war to a light force milieu. Even in large mass armies, such as those around the Asian rim, we saw a process of streamlining and lightening of the forces. Perhaps surprisingly, another interesting phenomenon we observed was an attempt by the officer corps in many of these armies to forego corruption and doctrinaire ideological stances—thus producing a more mature, professional, and better-educated officer class.

It was also somewhat of a shock to discover how knowledgeable of American operational methods many of these officers are. They also are intensely curious about how Americans fight. More specifically, they are interested in our doctrinal focus on the operational art. These armies in many ways have moved into the era that we faced back in the early 1970s. Much as we did, they moved from a tactical focus to one more directed at operational art and operational maneuver. Strategically, they seem bent on deflecting the ability of major world powers to interfere with their own hegemonic ambitions, principally by defeating incursions from air and sea.

They are also turning their attention to information technologies, but they come at it from a different vantage

point than we do. The last trip I made was to China. I had a chance to talk to my counterpart in that country. Many of his questions and comments dealt with information technology, information warfare, and so forth. His take was quite interesting. He said,

General, the information age is neutral; you have your style of war that is facilitated by information technology. It gives you the ability to see with great clarity and to strike with great speed and precision. But in our style of war, information technology is also helpful because the Internet and cellular communications allow us to do what we do best, which is to fight wars of area control; to capitalize on the endurance of our people; to exploit time and the inherent power of forces on the defensive to disperse, to go to ground, to control wide areas of territory, and still to maintain the ability to mass on demand.¹

The only English term he used during our conversation was "non-nodal Army," as contained in the following sentence delivered in Chinese: "What we seek to build is a non-nodal army." He was saying that modern distributive communications would permit control of massed armies without the necessity of large, cumbersome, hierarchical control headquarters.

Thus as the tectonic plates begin to collide in the post-2010 time frame, they are going to bring with them the possibility of collisions between different styles of warfare along these critical lines of contact. It seems to us that the war in Kosovo may very well have provided a foretaste of how such warfare might play out in the future.

Beyond the year 2010, though we might not see the rise of a true peer competitor, we may very well see the emergence of what was referred to in our AAN study as a "major competitor," one that uses its inherent strengths to counter our inherent weaknesses. In practically every country I visited, when I asked the question, "What are America's military weaknesses?" the answer that came back was "aversion to casualties and the political need to end the war quickly." Therefore, as one officer told me,

"Time is our friend and time is your enemy." Another recalled to me the famous response of Ho Chi Minh in 1964 when a French journalist asked him how he could possibly expect to beat the world's most technologically advanced country: "They will kill many of us, we will kill a few of them, and they will tire first."

Major competitors out beyond the year 2010 will not try to re-create a bipolar world. They won't try to match the United States weapon system for weapon system. They will focus on landpower and the ability to maintain an army in being. Their object will not be to defeat the United States, but rather to avoid losing. Meanwhile time will take its toll, or so the thinking goes, on the American popular will, and victory will accrue to our competitor by default. Remember Vietnam?

Now what does all this have to do with America's future relation with Europe? To go back to the AAN war games played in 1997 and 1998, in every one of those war games the critical element in achieving success was the ability of American forces to arrive early and position themselves so as to prevent the enemy from settling in and establishing control over the areas comprising his operational and strategic objectives. And regardless of the site of actual hostilities—in southeastern Europe, in Northeast Asia, or in the Middle East—Europe remained the critical launch platform.

Though we assumed initially that we would be able to project forces from the continental United States early enough to block the enemy on the ground and thwart his operational design, we later found that expectation to be totally unrealistic. Some form of forward stationing, whether of materiel or forces in being, had to be available at strategic intermediate staging bases in Europe. The forces already in Europe were usually the ones that arrived in the theater of hostilities first and applied the initial preemptive counterstroke. This action was critical because if the enemy succeeded in accomplishing his initial objectives, then

friction became a problem, time turned against us, casualties began to mount, resolve began to erode, and a successful outcome became extremely problematic.

It thus seemed to us in the AAN business that Europe would continue to have a vital role to play in the maintenance of global security and stability. It sits astride or near the intersection of three of the most active and dangerous strategic tectonic plates. Thus, whether as a site of conflict or solution for conflict, Europe remains critical on proximity grounds alone. Moreover, it represents a secure intermediate staging base that proved decisive in all our war scenarios.

Does that mean that the nature of our forces in Europe should remain immutable? While our games did not answer that question specifically, they seemed to suggest that tasks like humanitarian support, force projection support, C4ISR, forward intelligence support, and forward logistics basing are becoming increasingly important.² The possession of a forward logistics base will become particularly essential. It may therefore be that over the next 15 to 20 years the nature and character of forces in the region will change to reflect these growing support priorities. Whatever the precise nature of the forces in Europe, however, the AAN studies, exercises, and war games led me to conclude that Europe will continue to be a critical arena for the maintenance of global security, and that the United States can most efficiently and effectively contribute to such security by retaining appropriate forces in Europe.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Conversation with PLA senior leaders at the Nanjing Army Command College, Nanjing, China, August 21, 1998.
2. The acronym C4ISR encompasses command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND COMMENTARY, CHAPTERS 3, 4 AND 5

Dr. Carpenter. General Naumann made a point about the warming relations between Russia and China and the Russian proposal for a triangular alliance among these two countries and India. It's important to recognize that this development is not unrelated to the policies adopted by the United States and its NATO allies. The factors driving Russia, China, and India together are such things as the expansion of NATO's membership into central Europe and the prospective expansion even further east. Even more important are NATO's military actions in the Balkans. Many in the West regarded those as morally and strategically justifiable, but to the Russians, Indians, and Chinese, those actions were viewed in a very different light. In some ways this is International Relations Theory 101. Just as nature abhors a vacuum, the international system tends to abhor a unipolar system. The world does not want a global hegemon, even if that would-be hegemon sees itself as a benevolent hegemon, as the United States does. We should therefore expect movements towards the creation of a counter-hegemonic coalition. What we're seeing are probably the first stages of that.

General Naumann. I agree completely.

QUESTION. General Naumann, you said, and I think accurately, that we give Europe very little credit for its contributions to maintaining stability in Eastern Europe and in Russia. I confess, however, that I don't know specifically what Western Europe or NATO has done in that regard. Could you clear that up?

General Naumann. NATO's primary contribution has been the Partnership for Peace Program. That is a program to stabilize these fledgling democracies. You should never forget that though we often speak of these former Warsaw Pact countries as democracies, right now that's only formally true. Democracy is a phenomenon just visible at

the surface. The system of democracy is not yet deeply ingrained, and as is often the case in history, it is tied to economic well-being. Economic well-being and the stability of democracy have a close interrelationship which I cannot quantify exactly, but I know it's there. If we don't make sure that these countries prosper economically, there may be a tendency with the people to recall the old system as being better. For example, we have many people in Eastern Germany over the age of 45, the lost generation of the unification process, who believe the old system was better. There is a similar element in Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Thus we cannot be sure that democracy is now ingrained forever. There is a widespread illusion in the United States that democracy is the prevailing system in the world. In truth, democracies are the minority, and may remain so for a long time. Thus we have to work to make sure that the new countries stay the course.

Even more important than the Partnership for Peace Program is what the European Union nations are contributing economically. Germany, for example, has subsidized Russia to the tune of approximately 90 billion German marks. We did not see the result we had hoped for. The money was presumably one of many drops in the bucket, but at least we made an effort. Germany made similar gestures with regard to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Germany invests money in Bulgaria and Romania, and other European countries do the same. The European Union will shoulder a tremendous burden during the membership negotiations with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Estonia. Should the European Union continue the folly of the common agricultural policy as presently conceived, we will have to open several Fort Knox's to pay the bill. In any case, the effort to integrate Eastern European countries into the European community will represent a huge investment in stability. The Europeans will have to shoulder the bill. This reality is sometimes not well understood in America.

Dr. Carpenter raised the question of whether the American presence in Europe ever redounds to America's economic advantage. I was once closely involved in an important Iranian gas pipeline issue. I can state categorically that had there not been an American presence, the attitude of the German government would have been far different. As it was, however, the German government supported the position of the United States, an act very much in America's interest.

Professor Mearsheimer. It seems to me that the case for a sustained and sizable American military presence in Europe has to be based on the argument that we are the pacifier, to use Josef Joffe's term, in that region, and that having a stable Europe is a vital U.S. interest. Therefore, we should be willing to spend huge amounts of money and put our troops in harm's way in Europe, because if we do not, there will be intense security competition and maybe even war. But nobody seems to have spelled out what are the likely sources of trouble in Europe. I would like to know what is likely to go wrong if the United States pulls its troops out of Europe? What states are going to act as troublemakers? Russia? That seems highly unlikely. It is an economic and military basket case, with little chance that things will improve much over the next decade, at least to the point where Russia would be a meaningful threat. The British and the French? Are they going to cause trouble? Or is it the Germans who are the likely culprits? Are we going to have the second coming of the Third Reich? Or will it be the Second Reich? Are France and Germany going to get involved in a security confrontation? Almost everyone says that Germany is not a threat to cause trouble and that there is no need to fear it because it is a democracy. Of course, England and France are also democracies. All of this leaves me wondering which states are going to cause trouble in Europe? Where is the threat to peace that justifies an American military presence? If there is no threat to stability, I say bring the troops home and allow the Europeans to live in harmony with each other.

General Naumann. The idea of having the Americans there as pacifier in the case of intra-European conflict is outdated. The reason is that the German question is settled. The real reason behind World Wars I and II was the issue of Germany's orientation, whether to the East or to the West. This issue is settled once and forever. Germany belongs to the West. It's firmly tied to the Western community of nations. The issue of German revanchism is a dead legacy of the past. It was a terrible past, and we have all suffered from it terribly. We Germans, although most culpable in causing World War II, now know what it means to be divided, and as families we know what it means for children to grow up without knowing their fathers. I belong to a family in which neither my wife nor I ever had a chance to see our fathers alive since both of them were killed in action in Russia. We know what it means to the second generation to grow up without knowing what a grandparent is. It may sound emotional, but it is an impact that one feels over generations. Germany learned its lesson, and the pacification question is no longer an issue. The Germans are marching nicely in NATO ranks, and there will be no inclination to get out of that line.

Actually, if there is a problem with Germany, it lies in the opposite direction. After World War II, you told us to never use our military muscles again. But when German unification occurred, you were among the first who told us, "Hey Germans, stand on the parapet and be six feet tall." That doesn't happen overnight. It is a remarkable achievement that after a period of only 6 to 7 years Germany is now prepared to assume its full role and take on the responsibility to fight a war if necessary, as a reliable NATO ally. So, to repeat, pacification is not the issue.

The real issue is apart from the power projection issue which General Scales referred to and which from a strategic point of view is admittedly important. The predominant rationale for an ongoing U.S. presence in Europe is the management of Russian weakness. No European country can manage the problem of Russia. Without close U.S.

involvement, we may end up with serious trouble. This issue deserves your continued close attention.

It is much better for the United States to be closely involved in European issues than to be a benevolent but passive hegemon sitting some 6,000 kilometers away. As soon as you are back across the Atlantic, yours will be simply one of the many voices that we hear in our globally interconnected world. Yours is a powerful voice without any doubt, but you are some distance away from the center of gravity. I am not arguing that we Europeans should shirk from trying to resolve Europe's own backyard issues. I desperately hope that the European Union will have the guts to tackle them. But this will require some time. So at the end of the day, I would not be opposed to a formula which under the framework of NATO redefines the relationship between the United States and Canada on one hand, and the European Union on the other. But whether, as Dr. Carpenter seems to suggest, it will be possible for the United States to enjoy influence without paying the price of a presence, I have my doubts.

Dr. Carpenter. I was trying to think whether there was any aspect of John Mearsheimer's comments with which I disagreed, and could not come up with one. I'll simply comment briefly on General Naumann's argument that the U.S. military presence and the American leadership of NATO are needed to help "manage Russian weakness." Such an attempt is going to be a counterproductive strategy. First of all, it's really impossible for any outside power or group of powers to manage Russian weakness. Russia's fate is going to be largely decided by what goes on domestically in Russia. The external inputs may have an effect at the margin, but no more than that. But from the Russian viewpoint, a NATO-centered policy on the part of the United States, coupled with a U.S.-dominated, offensively oriented, and proactive NATO, an organization no longer committed simply to the territorial defense of its members, is not going to promote strong pro-Western, pro-democratic sentiments in Russia. Quite the contrary. The word that we at the Cato

Institute get from our contacts in Russia—and we maintain contacts specifically with the most pro-democratic, pro-Western, pro-capitalist elements in the Russian political and economic elite—was well summarized by former deputy prime minister Anatoly Chubois, who said that NATO managed to accomplish with its war in the Balkans what more than 7 decades of communist rule could not do. That is, NATO created a large reservoir of genuine anti-American, anti-Western sentiment in Russia. He added that the nationalist and communist forces were given “a political present the size of which they could never have imagined.” We are getting similar comments from other pro-Western figures in Russia. Therefore, if a U.S.-led NATO with its new mission of conflict resolution and nation-building is supposed to help manage Russian weakness, I think that is a disastrously counterproductive strategy.

QUESTION. With regard to the fault line concept in Samuel Huntington’s article, “The Clash of Civilizations,” there was an implication by Huntington that conflict between Islam and the two Christian factions was more or less inevitable. I wonder whether the fact that NATO and the Western countries have in general intervened in support of Islamic populations in the Balkans has possibly mitigated potential Christian-Islamic conflict. Will it possibly improve our relations with the Islamic world?

Major General Scales. U.S. involvement in that part of the world shouldn’t be focused necessarily on improving relations with the larger group—the Islamics. Rather, the object should be to diminish the propensity for violence among all three. If American intervention is somehow perceived as siding with Islam, that is counterproductive. Not only is it counterproductive in our long-term relationship with the Muslim world, but it would cause increased and unnecessary tensions with Russia. The term “honest broker” best describes the ideal U.S. role. After 50 years of American presence in Europe, the most commonly accepted opinion of that presence is that it is largely

altruistic and constructive. The main reason we're there is not to support one side or the other but to defuse conflict. To return to the metaphor of tectonic plates, we seek to manage the tremors that occur at this intersection of three fault lines now rather than marching away and waiting for an earthquake that's 8.0 on the Richter scale to occur 10 or 15 years down the road.

When the United States removes itself from a theater, it never goes back unless drawn back by war. With respect to three of the most critical sectors of the world island—Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia—it is hardly a coincidence that there is an American presence in all three. For 50 years that American presence has been benign and hugely effective. Before we as a nation pull up stakes and go back to Fortress America, we have to think through what the implications of that decision might be, not just over the next 10 years, but for the next generation. We Americans have a tough time thinking beyond the immediate horizon. However, for me as a serving soldier, our window of concern should extend out at least 20-25 years. At that range, one can visualize any number of catalysts that might come along to re-inflame tensions along the critical boundaries we have spoken of. The mere presence of American forces in those regions has palliated the level of violence, permitting us to deal with tremors rather than earthquakes.

QUESTION. If the United States now reverts to the posture of isolationism characteristic of the 1930s, aren't the odds high that conflicts and instabilities around the world will eventually reach out to engage us in spite of ourselves? Isn't it better to remain involved and work to prevent conflict rather than remain detached only to be dragged in later when the level of violence is far higher?

Dr. Carpenter. We need to be leery of such clichés as "Fortress America" and "isolationism." Certainly I'm not advocating Fortress America or isolationism or any other ill-considered extreme. I'm advocating that the United

States cease its smothering strategy in Europe and, for that matter, its even more smothering policy in East Asia. I'm advocating that we encourage the development of multiple centers of power in the international system, with the EU taking primary responsibility in Europe backed by the United States. The operative phrase is *backed by the United States* in a cooperative effort to preserve stability and security in Europe. In East Asia, I'm advocating that Japan and other regional powers take primary responsibility, *backed by the United States*, for ensuring stability and security. Such a backup role for the United States means that it would be the balancer of last resort instead of the intervenor of first resort—or global nanny—which is our current role. Playing such a role, we sometimes intentionally discourage initiatives on the part of American allies, more so in East Asia than in Europe, because such expressions of individualism threaten our primacy within those security relationships. Whether the strategy of global nanny was appropriate for the Cold War period, particularly the early part of the Cold War, is now a moot point. It is not an appropriate role, in fact it is an increasingly dangerous one, for the United States in the current and prospective strategic setting.

General Naumann. I listened very carefully to what Dr. Carpenter said about the negative opinions of Russian intellectuals regarding NATO involvement in the Balkans. Of course, one can get such impressions in talking to the institutniks. Remember, however, that these institutniks have shown remarkable flexibility in changing their attitudes over the past 15 years. I dare say that we will never learn what the real view of the Russian people is. The institutniks and politicians we talk to—the so-called elites—will always construe Western actions so as to blame us for their own failures. That is something that the Russians are extremely good at. Moreover, regardless of Western policies, whatever Russian leadership emerges will very likely be more nationalist than the present leadership is. The only way to satisfy the Russians would be

to give them equal status with the United States. If you do that, then you will have "good Russians." But is paying such a price in the interests of the United States? It's definitely not in the interest of the European allies of the United States.

Dr. Carpenter. In our conversations with the Russians, we are hardly talking to the Russian establishment. We're talking to people who are deeply critical of the Russian government and horrified at the communist and nationalist alternatives. These are people who have pointed out that the IMF-led strategy and the Western strategy generally of throwing money at Russia are abject failures. In fact, one of our contacts in Russia said, with telling irony, "You know, the IMF ought to eliminate the middle man and simply transfer the money directly to the offshore bank accounts of the Russian financial oligarchy, not sending it through Moscow. That is just a waste of time."

The Russians are certainly not expecting any more. They don't expect that their country is going to be treated as an equal of the United States. But they do expect a certain amount of respect. They expect that Russia will be treated as a major power in the international system, not treated with contempt, not denied a significant policy voice, for instance in the Balkans, as though that's a region in which Russia has never had any meaningful interests. Whether through clumsiness or through Russophobia, we're pursuing a policy of humiliating Russia at every opportunity. That is the effect. Russia has other options. They don't have to passively submit to such treatment. What we're finding is their cozying up to China, efforts to create a counter-hegemonic coalition, and arms transfers to recipients we are loath to see get them.

CHAPTER 6

THE ENLARGING ROLE OF NATO

Stephen Larrabee

It seems self-evident that the security structures of the Cold War might not be appropriate for deterring the types of challenges that the United States faces in the future. This proposition has direct relevance to NATO's missions, both now and in the future. The security environment in which NATO finds itself has changed significantly since 1989. The old security environment was characterized by a clear, uni-dimensional threat. This threat involved a possible direct attack on NATO territory. NATO's forces, therefore, were structured to deter such an attack. They tended to be tank-heavy, and they relied largely on conscript forces, Britain and the United States being the exceptions.

The new security environment is quite different. The challenges and risks today are far more diverse, far more ambiguous, and far less predictable. They include ethnic conflict, they include terrorism, and they include the spread of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the geographic focus of these challenges has changed. There is no longer, with the possible exception of Turkey, a direct threat to NATO territory. Most challenges that NATO will face come from beyond NATO's territory. But as we've seen in Bosnia and Kosovo, these challenges can still have an important impact on the security of Alliance members. As a result, NATO needs to be able to move, to respond to a broad spectrum of risks and threats. It still needs the residual capabilities to carry out Article 5 missions, that is, missions for NATO's collective defense, but at the same time it needs the capability to carry out so called non-Article 5 missions. These are missions of external crisis response and management similar to those NATO carried out in Bosnia and Kosovo. The fact is that most challenges and risks that NATO is likely to face in the future are non-Article 5 threats

rather than a direct attack on NATO's territory. They will much more resemble those in Bosnia and Kosovo than any attack that was expected during the Cold War. These trends have implications for NATO's core structures and missions. They mean that NATO will increasingly need the capability to deploy forces beyond its borders, that it will need the capability to project force and power.

More specifically, in order to deal with these new challenges NATO will need forces that are more mobile, flexible, sustainable, and survivable. The forces will need to be capable of deploying beyond NATO territory, and they will need to be more interoperable in order to carry out effective coalition operations. The Defense Capabilities Initiative, which was approved at the Washington Summit in April 1999, is designed to address these requirements. There were calls for improvements in five areas: mobility and deployability; sustainability and logistics; survivability; effective engagement; and command, control, and communications. If these improvements are made, NATO will be in a better position to address and deter the new threats it's likely to face in the coming decade.

The proposition that somehow the United States is trying to be a global nanny and preserve its primacy in Europe is simply wrong. On the contrary, what the United States is trying to do is push its allies to take up more responsibility for defense not only against threats in Europe, but against threats that emanate from beyond Europe. This is precisely what the Defense Capabilities Initiative is designed to do—not to preserve primacy, but to get the Europeans to improve their capabilities and to take more responsibility. There has been considerable criticism in the United States and especially in some parts of Congress of the new NATO. The basic complaint is that since NATO worked well for 50 years, there is no need to change it. As one senator said, "If it ain't broke, why fix it?" However, this view ignores the fundamental changes in the European security environment that have taken place since 1989. If NATO does not change—and I believe it already

has—if it does not adapt to meet the new security challenges, it risks becoming increasingly irrelevant. If NATO does not address the key security challenges, it will not be able to retain public support over the next decade. If it remains configured against a threat that no longer exists, it simply will not be credible.

But most of the Alliance's militaries, particularly the European militaries, are configured to defend borders that are no longer threatened. Britain and France are exceptions, while Italy and the Netherlands also are moving away from this posture. It is not that Europe lacks enough forces, but that they have the wrong type of forces. European forces are and remain very manpower-heavy, while underequipped with modern weapons and equipment. Countries of the European Union field about 1.9 million men, while the United States, with all its global responsibilities, has 1.4 million men under arms. Since the Europeans spend so much on manpower, there is little money left over for research and development, acquisitions, operations, and maintenance. For example, Germany, Italy, and Greece, together fielding 800,000 military personnel, which is close to 60 percent of the U.S. total, spend only 12 percent of what the United States does on procurement.

One source of the problem is that most European armies, except for Britain and Luxembourg, rely on conscription. Conscription produces more manpower than is needed for the missions that NATO must carry out today, and particularly tomorrow. Europe therefore will have to move towards a professional Army. France and Spain have already made the decision to do this. Pressure on the rest of the European militaries to do so is likely to increase. But developing a professional Army entails expenses of its own, especially in the initial phase, and funding will be difficult to achieve in an era of declining or flattening defense budgets.

In this regard, Kosovo has exercised a beneficial effect. Kosovo was for the Europeans a very sobering experience, a

wake-up call if you will, galvanizing them to address some of these deficiencies. It underscored the distinction between quantitative and qualitative superiority. Some 5 percent of the aircraft and four-fifths of the ordnance released against Serb targets were American. The gap was particularly glaring in precision guided missiles. At the same time, the Kosovo conflict demonstrated major differences in performance of individual European allies. France, with only 9 percent of NATO's defense spending, generated 12.8 percent of all the strike sorties. There are some signs that the Europeans are beginning to come to grips with this problem. There is within Europe now a new emphasis on capabilities rather than simply institutions. There is also an emphasis on building a real European security and defense identity. Whether this impulse will remain simply rhetoric or not remains to be seen, but nonetheless the emphasis is there.

ESDI, the European Security and Defense Identity, could provide the impetus for Europeans to enhance their capabilities. But it needs to avoid three potential pitfalls: first, de-coupling the United States from Europe; second, duplication of effort; and third, discrimination against NATO members who are not EU members, such as Norway and Turkey. Some critics in Congress and the United States military oppose NATO's new missions. They worry that these operations reduce the readiness of U.S. forces and their ability to respond to threats elsewhere. These are legitimate concerns, but in expressing them, they advocate a new division of labor in which Europe would take care of the threats in Europe while the United States looks after the rest of the world. This view, while superficially attractive, has several flaws. First of all, over the long term it would lead to increasing U.S. unilateralism. Second, the United States does not have the military capability to deter or address all the non-European conflicts on its own. Third, and most important, it would weaken the trans-Atlantic link. Europe would increasingly be left on its own. That is not a good idea.

A far better approach would involve a new strategic bargain, a new partnership with Europe, one that is broader and at the same time more equal. In this partnership, the United States would remain engaged in Europe and help Europe deal with security problems, while Europe at the same time would take up more responsibilities for Europe. In return, Europe would share with the United States more of the burdens and responsibilities for security beyond Europe's borders. The United States will need allies to manage many of the key security problems in the coming decade. The challenges are simply too large for one power to manage, even one as powerful as the United States. Europe will require a partner also, and the United States is its most likely and desirable partner. Unless Europe begins to assume more of the responsibility for challenges to common interests, U.S. support for NATO will decline.

Many of these challenges to common interests are on Europe's outermost periphery and even beyond its borders, such as those in the Persian Gulf. This is not to argue that NATO as an institution should directly address such threats. It's unlikely to get 19 nations to take concerted action against a threat as distant as the Gulf. Any military reaction would most likely come from a coalition of the willing, composed of several key American allies in Europe. But the NATO force planning process can be used to help develop the capabilities that would make such a coalition easier to establish and more militarily effective.

This is not, I want to emphasize, a call for a global NATO, as some critics have charged. NATO will be able to act only if there is a general consensus within the Alliance to do so. This will limit the number of crises in which NATO will be able to act, particularly those beyond Europe's borders. But it is important for the United States and its allies to take a broader view of their common interests and the threats to them. As noted earlier, many threats to these common interests in the future will not be in Europe, but on Europe's periphery or beyond. The United States and its European partners need the military capability to address

such threats. This requires in the end a broader and at the same time more balanced and equal partnership. In this sense, the United States has to move from being a protector to being a more equal partner with Europe.

CHAPTER 7

GUIDING NATO'S FUTURE: A RETURN TO BASICS

Charles Glaser

I shall start from the assumption that major war in Europe would be a serious problem for the United States. This proposition is arguable, I suppose, but there seems to be a sufficient consensus to permit me to accept it and then move on to its implications.

Since the end of the Cold War, we've seen a long list of possible missions for NATO, ranging widely in purpose. One of the most important but least discussed is to maintain a hedge against a resurgent Russia. Another important one is to preserve confidence, stability, and peace among Europe's other major powers in Western Europe. The issue there is renationalization of militaries and what that would do. This is also not talked about very much. Preserving peace among NATO's other members is a third possibility, Greece and Turkey most prominently. Then we get to the newer missions: promoting the establishment of democracy and free markets throughout Europe; preserving peace among Europe's non-NATO members; and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has begun to stress such new missions, whether they are undertaken by NATO itself or by a smaller coalition formed among NATO members. Such declared priorities as maintaining peace and stability in Europe broadly defined and promoting democracy and free markets reflect one of the following subtexts: either Russia is not worth worrying about now and maybe not in the future, or—and this is actually quite a common view—Russia is worth worrying about, if not now, then definitely in the future. However, many analysts believe this latter rationale will not sell to the public, and

thus find themselves creating pretext missions for NATO to save it for the authentic uses they think will not sell on merit alone.

The clearest examples of this were the early arguments for NATO expansion. The argument was framed something like this: we need to expand NATO so that it doesn't dissolve; it must expand or die. Such an argument raises the question of whether the expansion is justified on its own terms or whether NATO is being preserved for something else, and if so, what. The same questions apply to out-of-area missions. But there is mounting concern that some of these new missions, these humanitarian and stabilization interventions throughout Europe, may not sell in the United States because they do not address vital American interests. They are important American interests but they are not vital interests. Nonetheless, there has been a continuing effort to preserve NATO for eventual service in behalf of America's truly vital interests by linking NATO with peripheral causes that, while certainly important, fall well short of vital.

However, the most compelling reason for keeping the Alliance remains the need to deal with Russia—not the Russia of today but the potential Russia down the road, not a weak Russia but a resurgingly powerful Russia, not a Russia with goals like those of America and Europe but a Russia whose goals are starkly antithetical to those of the West. Such a rationale has the best hope of preserving the Alliance. It hasn't been sold by American leaders, but my hunch is that it can be. Far from striving to preserve the Alliance, the new NATO missions are actually a threat to it. It's not that these missions are unjustified on their own terms. Certainly the recent experience in the Balkans, where we've saved thousands of lives, perhaps tens of thousands, and alleviated much human suffering, shows that they are important. But they will over time strain the Alliance and thus make it more likely that when we need it for bigger purposes, it won't be there or it will be too attenuated to do the job.

In sum, proponents basically are promoting these new missions as a way to save the Alliance, implying that we should perform them even if each individual action isn't justified on its own terms, because the efforts in the aggregate will justify themselves by preserving NATO. I would argue the reverse. They may be worth doing on their own terms, and they're certainly very valuable from a humanitarian angle, but we should recognize that they actually threaten the Alliance and view the trade-off with our eyes wide open. I would argue for narrowing our view of NATO's purpose, not banning it from taking on these other missions, not precluding them as an option, but viewing the Alliance differently, in terms of fundamental U.S. interests. Such interests lie in deterring or winning a major power war. Superficially, one might conclude that I'm stuck in a Cold War frame of mine. But it's not a Cold War frame of mind. It's a geopolitical or power-oriented frame of mind, bent on connecting U.S. vital interests with threats to those interests. Many actions possibly worth taking are not related to those interests. We need to be quite clear when such is the case so that we can properly evaluate the inevitable trade-offs involved in expending resources on interests that, while worthwhile, are not vital.

Why is hedging against a future Russian threat still the strongest argument for keeping NATO? Recalling the list of possible missions for NATO that I discussed earlier, there are only two that deal with vital U.S. interests in a European context: addressing the danger from Russia and preventing conflict among Western powers themselves. Let's look at those.

It is both difficult and dangerous to dismiss the possibility of a future threat from Russia. Yes, one can do so if he puts aside Russia's nuclear weapons. The country is weak, possibly disintegrating, disorganized, and struggling with a variety of political and economic transformations which it may not accomplish. However there's a reasonable bet, not a certain bet, maybe less than fifty-fifty, that in the next century Russia will become a strong power again. It's a

very large country, a rich country, with tremendous human capital. If it puts institutions into place that work, it can be a powerful country again, not in 10 years the way things are going, but perhaps in 20 or 30. In the long march of history, the burden of maintaining a strong NATO for another 20-30 years as a hedge against a resurgent, nuclear-armed Russia is certainly not excessive.

Russia remains a major nuclear power and will for the foreseeable future unless it collapses in a truly fundamental way. This is not impossible, but it's not a comforting thought either, since a radical collapse of the Russian government would unleash threats to our security that, while different in nature, would be no less dangerous. Russia is not a threat to western Europe or central Europe today, but there are some potential leaders of Russia who could pose a threat, who could have goals that ultimately threaten the Europe lying west of Russian borders. U.S. concern over future dangerous aggression from Russia is appropriate if one accepts that major war in Europe would threaten vital U.S. interests.

With regard to stability within western Europe itself, I tend to be more confident than pessimistic. Renationalization of European forces probably would not lead to conflict. But it is possible that we might end up with a nuclear Germany. I don't think Europe could handle that as well. But such an eventuality could perhaps be made more acceptable and manageable if it occurred in the context of a more unified European force. That's another possibility. In any event, I don't see major conflict coming out of western Europe whether the United States stays or leaves. If the United States stays and we preserve NATO the way it is, it eliminates any concerns of German nuclearization. I don't look on this as a major benefit because the likelihood of such a move on Germany's part is so small, but the reassurance is on the plus side.

The other American interests associated with U.S. continuance in NATO are, with all due respect, secondary

interests or even tertiary interests. We have traditionally defined American interests in terms of threats to the United States, its territory, its people, and its sustaining economic interests. Humanitarian conflicts don't pose threats to such U.S. interests. The markets in Europe that we're interested in will not be undermined, though they may be strained, by some of the collateral impacts of those conflicts. But they're not vital in the sense that we invest tens of billions of dollars a year in the areas affected and are willing to sacrifice large numbers of American lives to pacify them. Of course, such actions may be worth taking anyway. That's an issue on which we need informed debate in this country.

However, to develop a point I broached earlier, continuing to pursue such secondary missions and, more importantly, identifying NATO with those missions will strain and possibly endanger the Alliance. That is a risky course because we require a viable NATO while we wait out the transformation in Russia, and, to some extent, while we wait out the creation of a unified defense and security policy in Europe. To put attainment of these goals at risk represents potentially large costs of pursuing secondary missions, although having to pay such costs may have low probability.

Let's now look more closely at why pursuit of secondary missions is going to strain the Alliance. These secondary missions are aimed at providing stability and security in Europe outside of the NATO membership, including the Balkans. They may even entail admission of new members beyond the current ones and extending to them Article 5 protections. This latter idea is, of course, part and parcel of the current NATO expansion debate. There is substantial disagreement within NATO about going beyond the present geographical confines of the NATO countries. Thus there is likely to be strong support for maintaining the mission oriented on Russia, but far less support for the new missions.

The man in the street understands this—I don't know why it escapes the understanding of the elites. I ask my relatives and friends who are not in the security affairs business, "Are you confident that Russia, now that it's weak, is not going to be a problem for us down the road?" They say, "No, I'm not confident at all." They understand the situation. Fallen states have risen. Weak states have become strong states. States have recovered from worse misfortunes and become major powers. Russia will do the same. People understand that major war in Europe, particularly nuclear war, would be a threat to the United States. They realize that Russia is a nuclear power, and it's going to face other nuclear powers in Europe. Ask them, "Are you willing to maintain NATO if it doesn't cost too much to hedge against such a threat even though right now you don't need to build forces directed against that threat?" I believe the answer will be yes. It depends on keeping the costs within bounds. The costs of NATO are dropping, and they are not inordinate. The forces are smaller. They can get somewhat smaller if necessary. The Quadrennial Defense Review barely mentions force requirements for Europe. The force drivers are outside of Europe.

Public sentiment on the new missions, however, is up for grabs. It may be that there will be broad support within the United States and NATO for doing these things. They are obviously honorable and important missions. But there is tremendous aversion to casualties, to the use of ground troops. There was no guarantee the war in Kosovo would be a success. According to the commentaries written during the war about the impact of a failure in Kosovo on NATO, there was great concern that the air campaign would fail and that the Alliance would be hurt. Failure would have undercut the way NATO was defining itself in terms of new missions. Though we have been successful in Kosovo thus far, no one can foresee what the ultimate result will be, nor can one foresee whether similar undertakings in the future will be able to avoid failures that rend the Alliance.

The path of wisdom demands rather that NATO revert to its primal role—to protect Europe from major power war. Arrangements could be flexible enough to permit ad hoc secondary missions when circumstances demanded it and public resolve was strong, but such missions would be exceptional as a matter of policy. If NATO chose to demur regarding any proposed interventions, it would not be seen as a defeat for the Alliance since there would be no declaratory policy generating pro forma expectations of out-of-area involvements. In the near term, NATO might still want to configure its forces for secondary operations because, while waiting to see what happens in Russia, intervention forces will be the only kind it will need. NATO will need forces that can be deployed out of its area, but it won't define itself fundamentally in terms of such a role. It will define itself in terms of patient vigilance, helping avoid what's most dangerous over the horizon. There is no inconsistency in such a stance.

How should one characterize such a policy? Here, rhetoric is important. Policymakers could say candidly that the policy is a hedge, but this formulation is impolitic, given our efforts to promote cooperation with Russia. Some have suggested a less pointed term like "strategic reassurance" or "reassurance against great power war," and this is probably wisest. The rhetoric and terms need to be worked out over time. Whatever their precise formulation, they will need to reassure Western Europe about threats from within and without, and they will need to reassure Russia that NATO is not ganging up on it or denying it its rightful place on the international stage.

If we believe that a future Russia is something we need to worry about, and thus need to be planning for, then we must bear in mind several corollary factors. We need to have an alliance in place against the time when Russia is strong and dangerous. In the interim, we need to avoid pursuing a set of policies that make such a Russia more likely. Rather, we must pursue policies that help with the transformation of Russia in the desired directions. Some of these policies are

specifically American, some specifically NATO. For example, NATO should be wary of taking on new members at present, particularly the Baltic countries. It would be wiser to wait until those countries actually begin to face a threat and then deciding. To extend North Atlantic Treaty Article 5 protection to them now when they don't need it could be self-defeating. On the American side, we should be somewhat more willing to make compromises with Russia on nuclear policy. National missile defense is a prime example. Surely it is not smart for us to initiate a national missile defense system that may not be technically feasible and workable but which is still quite unacceptable from Russia's perspective.

Economic assistance is another area where the United States must take a farsighted approach. Such assistance may be far more symbolic than practical, but it's important that we not try to keep Russia down and that Russia not perceive us as trying to keep it down, even though it will be aware of our concern over a possible aggressive turn by Russia in the future. Our approach should be to help Russia become strong, even as we encourage to the extent possible its creation of free and democratic institutions and its establishment of firm political, economic, and security ties with the western family of nations.

In sum, I am suggesting a risk-averse approach for NATO. Though some may see this approach as too risk-averse, it has the virtue of going back to basics. It returns to the view that NATO is fundamentally a military alliance and that the American stake in remaining a member is to protect its manifest vital interests. Such a posture does not preclude taking on new missions, which may become increasingly important and pressing in the next decade, but it keeps the priorities clear, always distinguishing vital interests from the merely important.

CHAPTER 8

AN ADDITIONAL ROLE FOR NATO: PROMOTING COLLECTIVE SECURITY ELSEWHERE

Carl Kaysen

Sentiment today appears divided as to whether NATO's original prime mission—mutual defense in a bipolar world under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—is still important. In any event, most seem to agree that within the next 10 years it's hardly likely to be relevant. I would argue, however, that 20 years is a better estimate of the time span in which Article 5 is unlikely to be relevant. Therefore I do not think it can be successfully maintained, even in a reassurance or contingent mode, as the central mission for NATO now.

The American government, in urging NATO expansion and leading the way to that result, argued for an extension of the zone of peace, stability, democracy, and market economies all tied together in Europe as the central new mission of NATO. I take an extremely dim view of that goal. In expanding NATO, we have already created negative effects on the security prospects of Europe that far outweigh whatever gains we have made. I recognize the powerfully earnest desire of the Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians to be in NATO, and I'm sure that other would-be NATO members share those desires, but such desires rest on a poor calculation of their interests. There are more effective interest-serving instruments with which present and aspiring NATO members can pursue the admirable goals of extending the zone of peace, stability, democracy, and market economies in Europe.

The European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are much more suitable entities. The OSCE, now comprised of some 54

states, sets standards in such areas as military security, economic and environmental cooperation, human rights, and humanitarian activities. Also, it undertakes a variety of preventive diplomatic initiatives designed to deter, manage, or resolve conflict touching participant states. We have certainly struck OSCE and NATO's own Partnership for Peace (PfP) program a heavy blow by NATO expansion. It remains to be seen whether it's a mortal wound. The wound probably need not be mortal if we don't press on it further.

For a variety of reasons, the world's nation-state system based on the Westphalian model of 1648 is no longer even an approximately good description of the globe's political organization. The most important reason is the degree and quantity of economic interconnections among nations. It's not only that we now have massive international flows of capital, it's not only the international dispersion of jobs, it's the fact that we have evolved a set of norms, many of them embodied in institutions, some of them embodied in intertwining legal codes, that govern not only economic behavior but are serving a normative role in other interstate activities. If one looks closely at the everyday economic life of the EU states, he will be hard-pressed to describe them as self-sufficient sovereigns relying on the principle of self-help in an anarchic world. They are entangled in a thick web of normative and institutional constraints that tell them what they should and what they shouldn't do, what's legitimate to think of doing and what's not legitimate to think.

Another factor impelling us to look beyond the nation-state system is the growing ambiguity of civil conflict, ethnic and religious violence, interstate terrorism, and international crime, all of which tend to spill over borders in one fashion or another and touch us all. Such threats to peace, order, and stability are not confined to Europe or any single region. They are world-wide problems, and they are increasingly demanding international attention, involvement, and solutions.

The final factor leading to the irrelevance of the Westphalian system is that most governments in the world today have taken on a decidedly populist cast. Admittedly, the democracies of central Europe are not deep-rooted. Russia, for example, has not yet had a complete election cycle which resulted in an enduring peaceful transfer of power within the executive and legislative branches, and it remains to be seen whether the Vladimir Putin presidency can pull this rabbit out of the hat. Thus an exacting test of formal democracy there has not yet been met. But we can say that with very few exceptions, such as North Korea and Iraq, the primary theme of today's national governments is in some sense pleasing the public. That characterization applied even to the communist government in the USSR after Stalin. The premiership of Nikita Khrushchev was, despite his note of contempt in applying the phrase "a government of goulash communism" to it, basically satisfied the people. This was so despite the fact that it provided too little goulash for Soviet dinner tables and bought too many missiles for the Soviet army.

Governments that please the people are influenced by the people. Such governments may not be democratic; the popular influence may be distorted; it may be partly repressed; it may be provided with few channels for formal expression—but it's there. The populist impulse is magnified by other elements now manifesting themselves on a world-wide scale: the simultaneous sharing of news information and a large degree of shared culture. Moreover, we have a set of entrepreneurs of popular sentiment, the non-governmental organizations, that make it their business to organize such sentiment, canalize it, and thus influence governments, which they do with varying degrees of success on various issues. As a result, the bounds of sovereignty, that is, the actions which sovereign governments may legitimately take in relation to the areas and populations over which they are nominally sovereign, are increasingly constrained by a steady growth of a widely shared public view of what is right and just.

A corollary of the growing irrelevance of the nation-state is the concurrent growing relevance of supranational forms of political organization, of which, as noted earlier, the EU and OSCE are promising examples. We should do all we can to strengthen and broaden such entities where appropriate and particularly to avoid actions that tend to undermine them like the counterproductive expansion of NATO. With further regard to perceptions of the evolving status of the nation-state, we may note that states where the rule of law is absent, where security of the person and basic human rights are routinely denied, are falling more and more under a cloud of universal opprobrium. The time may not be too distant when such states risk being formally denied the imprimatur of legitimate sovereignty by the international community. Humanitarian interventions in retrograde states, which are becoming the sanctioned norm when human suffering and deprivation are intolerable, might become the occasion for externally imposed political reform.

What, then, is the task of NATO over the next 10 years? Clearly it will have to be prepared to take on important missions on the periphery such as humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Beyond these, however, we should note that NATO has a very significant asset, and of that asset it holds a monopoly. Specifically, NATO has learned how to raise, train, and operate a multinational military force with efficiency and unity of command. Such an alliance capability is something the world needs more of. If one thinks of what a more comprehensive security architecture might be 10 or 20 years from now, it would emphasize what we see very faint beginnings of in Latin America (Organization of American States), even fainter and less coherent beginnings in Africa (Organization of African Unity), and possibly an organization of some promise in Europe (OCSE). If these or similar germs are to grow into instruments holding genuine promise for regional security, they will require some kind of effective multinational force. Such a force will need to be organized, equipped, rapidly deployable, disciplined, and, above

all—legitimate. A big question is whether such a multi-national force—dedicated to humanitarian intervention, conflict suppression, and conflict prevention missions—is possible. Experience to date says, “Maybe.”

One of the things we could do to make such an outcome more possible is to use NATO, not only as a model but as trainer and mentor. NATO could be employed to teach other militaries how to organize and equip for alliance warfare and how to execute humanitarian and peace missions. During the Cold War, U.S. forces placed great emphasis on military-to-military contacts with allied and friendly armies throughout the world, forging bonds of friendship and mutual trust that redounded to the benefit of security for all parties. Perhaps we can do this again on a larger scale and in the context of NATO assistance to regional security alliances lying beyond NATO’s own territorial preserve.

QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND COMMENTARY, CHAPTERS 6, 7, AND 8

QUESTION. Let’s grant that Russia is NATO’s primary problem. But what do you do when you have problems like Bosnia and Kosovo that continue to fester, creating instability and producing such outrages as genocide?

Professor Glaser. I didn’t mean to preclude those for NATO missions. What I meant to say was that NATO or a sufficient group within NATO should have the option of dealing with those cases. However, we need to shift the balance of how we describe and think about the purpose of the Alliance. Our posture should be that the most legitimate, important, and long-term purpose of NATO lies to the east, although it may not be the most immediate problem facing the Alliance. NATO then has the option, confronted by another Kosovo-like crisis, of declining to take up the challenge for any one of a number of good reasons. For example, future governments in NATO may view the situation differently. They should have the option simply of expressing regret but refusing to get involved. We should

not now either by precedent or declaratory policy lock NATO into an indefinite commitment to undertake secondary missions. Even today, there are many humanitarian problems that NATO refuses to take on. I'm not precluding them, but rather merely urging a clear-eyed examination of where they stand on our scale of important interests.

Dr. Larrabee. The central purpose of an alliance cannot be to address a threat which at the moment and for the foreseeable future doesn't exist. The real problem today with Russia is not hedging against its power, but rather managing its weakness. The difficulty thus is not the danger of a nuclear attack, although one can't completely ignore that. The more likely difficulty would be the result of loose nukes, and that is where we need to turn our attention. We need not magnify some threat. We need not curry public support for a threat that doesn't exist. That would be wrong. It would make the development of a partnership with Russia, however difficult and problematic, virtually impossible. I would rather focus on the actual problem at hand, which is to try to develop a partnership with Russia. Even so, it is important to stipulate that NATO has not abandoned deterring a residual threat from Russia. The strategic concept in every NATO statement always talks about the continued importance of Article 5 and collective defenses as the core mission. But we must decide where to put our emphasis in the near term.

QUESTION. We are likely to see an even more explosive growth of world trade and the opening up of new markets in the first half of the 21st century than experienced in the second half of the 20th century. What is the best strategy for NATO to follow to promote world economic growth and stability in the first 50 years of the new century?

Professor Kaysen. The prospects for economic growth are good, but uncertain. They are highly contingent on political stability, and NATO does play a role in that. Europe will remain important to the United States, and the U.S.-European partnership will play a large role in

promoting economic health throughout the world. Even so, we will find our security more in the spread of shared norms of what's right than through other avenues.

Professor Mearsheimer. Implicit in your question and in Professor Kaysen's answer is the belief that increasing economic interdependence promotes peace. In other words, as states get richer and become more interconnected, there is a substantial decrease in the likelihood of war between them. There is a large international relations literature on this subject and it finds little support for that claim. Before World War I, for example, there was a significant amount of economic interdependence and prosperity in Europe, but war still happened. More recently, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990 in good part because Kuwait was over-producing its OPEC oil quotas and driving down world oil prices, thus harming the Iraqi economy, which was already in serious trouble from its war against Iran between 1980 and 1988. In short, because of the interdependency of Iraq and Kuwait through their membership in OPEC, Iraq chose to attack its neighbor. Thus, we should at least have reservations about the claim that economic interdependence produces peace.

Professor Kaysen. The interdependence in existence before World War I was qualitatively very different from that prevailing today. It did not have the kind of institutional support that we have nor did the interdependence occur under the aegis of a benevolent hegemon like the United States of today.

QUESTION. With regard to the out-of-area crises that NATO might address, what would be the limitations? Would we go as far south as Sudan, as far east as Pakistan? Would we address crises other than humanitarian?

Dr. Larrabee. The threats that NATO faces are not confined to Europe. The types of threats to the common interest extend beyond Europe's borders. The fact of the matter is, however, that in order for NATO to take action, it's going to need a consensus among 19 countries. Those 19

countries are most likely going to agree to take action only in those crises where they feel their interests are truly at stake. Most such instances are going to be in and around Europe. The term "around Europe" is very ambiguous, and that's because there is no real consensus in NATO as to exactly how far Europe extends. For example, does it extend out into the Mediterranean? The distance and type of missions would depend on the consensus in NATO itself. By and large, that consensus will remain very Europe-oriented.

QUESTION. If NATO focuses primarily on the long-range mission of monitoring and deterring a resurgent Russia, while focussing secondarily on near- and mid-term interventionist missions, won't it create confusion regarding core structure, budget, and training for its tactical forces?

Professor Glaser. NATO would basically be in the position of being there in case problems arise someday with Russia. In the interim, it would have to plan and prepare for more likely missions. NATO would be there as a diplomatic statement of U.S. commitment to Europe, in the face of something that may or may not happen. As Russia changed over time and if the threat changed, then NATO would evolve quite dramatically in terms of size and types of forces to meet the threat. Of course, skeptics might ask, "Isn't it odd that NATO is buying forces for its secondary purposes and not for its first purpose?" That question would have to be answered, but there is no fundamental contradiction.

Thus I'm not proposing that we prepare for a Russian threat now. But when we look at core interests on down the road, we need to be sensitive to Russian potential. If you believe that once the Americans leave Europe, it will be very hard ever to get them back and reconstitute a strong multinational alliance, then there's a logic to waiting. That is a bit of a hard sell. Am I confident that we can maintain NATO by that argument? No. Am I more confident that we can maintain it by that argument than by attempting to justify it through new missions? Yes. Thus we have good

news and bad news. The good news is that the Cold War has been over for 10 years, and the predominant threat is gone for the foreseeable future. The bad news is that we must puzzle through what type of alliance we want to keep, and this involves us in a more complicated argument. Yes, security has become more complicated, but the world is not necessarily more dangerous. If it is more dangerous, I'm not sure that NATO is well prepared to handle all the dangers. But there are a couple that it may be prepared to handle, and those are the ones I've talked about.

Professor Kaysen. To obtain continued funding for a strong NATO against the possibility of a resurgent Russia some 10 years hence will be an impossible sell. If NATO doesn't have serious missions, it can't be supported. It's an illusion to think that we can get support for NATO, especially in Europe, for an organization that doesn't address the key security concerns in Europe itself today. That is like telling your neighbor, whose house is on fire, that the more serious threat from fire is the decrepit mansion down the street and that we should send the fire engines there, while letting the neighbor's house continue to burn.

QUESTION. For those who do want NATO to survive, wouldn't it be more logical to redefine its essence, proclaiming as its new primary mission humanitarian and peace missions, which are, after all, what NATO is actually carrying out these days? Why would such missions shatter the Alliance in the long term?

Professor Glaser. It's a judgment call. My sense is that there's tremendous ambivalence in the United States over paying high costs for humanitarian interventions, despite the worthiness of the cause. It may be that I'm wrong and that, in fact, the American people would commit themselves to a full range of interventions in Europe. If they are, then in the short term that's going to be a better way to sell the Alliance. Both Bosnia and Kosovo have turned out reasonably well. It wasn't guaranteed that they would,

particularly Bosnia, where our intervention during the early rough going did strain the Alliance. It depends on how well you think you can sell this argument. I'm open to the fact that both rationales—remaining primed for a resurgent Russia 10-plus years hence, or refocusing on secondary missions today—are going to be hard sells over time. Until we've obtained contravening data, the latter rationale might be easier to sell. But if we were sure that Russia is going to be either benign or weak, and if we were sure that there will be no problem between western powers, then it would raise the question whether the United States should stay in Europe at all. Such a question would touch off a very important national debate, leading to discussion of how the resources saved should be spent.

QUESTION. In the post-Kosovo environment, what are the prospects and advisability of further NATO expansion?

Dr. Larrabee. First, let me comment on Kosovo itself. The real problem is not NATO being involved in Kosovo. The real problem is that 75 percent of the missions were carried out by Americans. Americans are entitled to ask why they should have to carry the lion's share of such a campaign. NATO has been trying to redress that balance and get the Europeans in better shape to carry out these missions so the United States won't have to. If there were a re-balancing and if the Europeans enhanced their capabilities, there would not be so much of a problem with U.S. support. As to the question of NATO enlargement, there will be increasing pressures in the wake of Kosovo to enlarge the Alliance, in part because the countries of southeastern Europe went out on a limb in many cases, providing transit routes, facilities, and so forth. There's a feeling in the region at the moment, for example in Bulgaria and Romania, that since they did go out on a limb to support NATO, it is now pay-back time.

At the same time, I think that such a rationale for expansion is wrong. Our difficulties in Kosovo underline the importance of having members that are in fact contributors to security, not consumers of it. A problem with the region is

that most of the candidates for NATO membership are very much consumers of security and would not make major contributions to the Alliance. Therefore, NATO will require a gradualist approach which continues to keep the door open while undertaking to enhance its candidates' capabilities to be useful and contributing members. In the wake of Kosovo, the answer is not to open up a floodgate for new members. This would undermine NATO's capacity to carry out many of the new missions it's going to have, rather than increasing stability in southeastern Europe.

CHAPTER 9

UPDATING NATO FORCES FOR THE 21st CENTURY

Thomas G. McInerney

NATO forces have been drawn down substantially since the end of the Cold War in 1989, but the Alliance's military command, control, and staffing apparatus remains intact, fully prepared to direct NATO forces in any future missions decided upon by competent political authority. My purpose in this chapter is to discuss the type of forces the United States will need to deploy in order to meet its commitments in Europe, with particular emphasis upon air forces.

The United States maintains about 2.3 wings on NATO territory today pledged to the Alliance. They're not actually chopped to NATO control until certain conditions are met but they plan and train for operational commitment under the aegis of NATO protocols. In addition to the 2.3 wings, we train and exercise a continuous stream of Guard and Reserve forces in Europe. It is vital to prepare such augmentees, who will arrive in time of war.

The aircraft are designed for close air support, air interdiction, air defense, in-flight refueling, long-range transport, and maritime support. Those are the missions performed today and that will be required in the future. It's been easier for the Air Force to transition to a post-Cold War force than the Army. We've only had to make some changes in our support and the way we fund our support activities to give our forces mobility. We now have a much smaller assemblage of air forces compared to the 14 wings present at the height of the Cold War.

We do a great deal of training in Europe. Training in the Balkan air space while operating out of Aviano, Italy, was vital. There was no way, even in a peacetime exercise, that we could squeeze in the number of aircraft employed in

Kosovo and not risk airplanes. That's an inescapable problem when you are using that kind of mass and operating in those weather conditions. Hard and realistic training was what enabled aerial units to accomplish what they did in Kosovo. The force structure in Europe today—some 32,000-33,000 personnel and 230 attack, tanker, transport, and fighter aircraft, with a healthy mix of precision weapons—seems about right for the foreseeable future.

During the 11 weeks of Operation ALLIED FORCE, the 7,000 attack sorties represented the highest use of precision weapons in our history. Fortunately, Mr. Milosevic was the recipient of that ordnance, and any future adversary who commits a similar outrage can expect to see such NATO forces coming after him. The Air Force will be investing in these areas, particularly in weapons like the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), a satellite-guided all-weather bomb used with the B-2. The B-2 can carry 16 JDAMs today, and we're now in the process of modifying the airframe so it can drop 78 in one pass. The bomb will hit within several yards of its target. We don't call it precision, we call it near-precision. A 2,000-pound bomb going off that close is as precise as it needs to be. With a price tag of less than \$14,000 (the laser-guided versions originally cost \$150-200 thousand per bomb), this new version is far more affordable. Clearly, it should be made available to our NATO allies. It's very important that they train and invest in this aspect of air operations.

Prior to and during Operation ALLIED FORCE, we brought in some 700 aircraft to augment the 230 already present in Europe. As mentioned earlier, we don't need a force structure of over 900 aircraft in Europe. We require about 2-plus wings, and the scope to train, exercise, and move our people in and out. The importance of getting prior domain experience for air crews in the area where they are going to operate simply cannot be emphasized enough. International air traffic conditions and procedures, not to mention weather and geography, are more difficult in

Europe than in the United States. Our forces must be trained to operate where they are likely to fight.

For future Alliance operations, one area in which we need improvement is that of command, control, communications, intelligence, and surveillance—specifically, disseminating in near real time the requisite information to air crews so that we can re-task airplanes quickly when the necessity arises. In this information age, we ought to be doing better. Frankly, if I had to give us a grade, I'd probably give us a D. It is a pressing problem for the future force and for the Alliance. We must develop a seamless system, one in which all air crews automatically receive the timely informational wherewithal to operate with optimal effort.

So far as drones—unpiloted aerial vehicles—are concerned, we are doing some things we never believed we could do. Initially, we were using them only for surveillance. We have now progressed to the point, however, where drones can target a tank under a tree. We will need to capitalize on such capabilities in our future force structure. We will need to be able to deploy the machines and have the proper command, control, communications, intelligence, and surveillance to fully exploit their potential. It is very important that all Allied members receive the drone technology and that they be able to execute electronic warfare. All will need a force structure that will be successful in a Balkan-type environment and can survive against surface-to-air missiles and an integrated air defense system.

Stealth is very important, and the Air Force puts a lot of effort into it. The B-2 became the star platform because the weather degraded the capabilities of other aircraft. Two B-2s dropping 16 bombs each, thus hitting 32 targets with great accuracy, provided a very powerful return. That capability must be part of the future force structure made available to NATO.

Not all aircraft will be Stealth, obviously. We are anticipating a joint strike fighter, which will be Stealth, but such a fighter in significant numbers is 10-15 years out. Thus we're going to have to do with the current aircraft, which is disturbing. The average age of all the aircraft in Kosovo was 26 years. Europe as well as the United States has a major modernization problem in front of it. Europe also needs to be thinking in terms of procuring airlift and tankers so they'll have mobility. All these concerns are important.

We also need to keep in mind the Sixth Fleet, which performs the essential role of protecting NATO's flanks. Domain experience is vital as well for naval forces. It may not be necessary to have a carrier in the Mediterranean all the time, but carriers do need to be present 4 to 6 months a year if only for training the naval forces how to operate there.

How do we pay for all this? Today, 70 percent of the \$266 billion slated for defense goes into what we call tail, that is, support infrastructure, overhead, headquarters, etc. Only 30 percent goes to the warfighter. We do too many things in the military that are not core business. We need to outsource and privatize peripheral endeavors, we need to close about 35 more bases, and we need to have more acquisition reform to eliminate costs that don't add value. That will provide money for high-value items like JDAM and for the warfighter.

We are working this military too hard. We have been on a procurement holiday. Army trucks are 40 years old. The average age of Air Force airplanes is over 20 years. It's the oldest it has ever been in our history. We're depreciating the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines at the rate of \$118 billion a year. In 1998 we put in only \$44 billion for procurement. That's the procurement holiday. It's an aging force. The next administration has got to address that problem. It's going to have to shift dollars to the warfighter.

I do not see a large influx of dollars coming in. To modernize the force and meet our present commitments, we need an *additional* sum of about \$300 billion a year. The President has slated only \$112 billion per year over a 6-year period. The Joint Chiefs have asked for \$148 billion per year over a 6-year period. But we need \$300 billion per year to fix the problem if we want to fix it the way we used to do. But we should not fix it that way. We should fix it the way U.S. industry was fixed—by reengineering and reforming. For example, there are 40,000 people in the Department of Defense today who are in the finance and accounting business. None of them pull a trigger. A private sector organization would probably have 8,000. We need to shift the dollars spent on those other 32,000 people to the warfighting side. With such truly fundamental reform, we could modernize at considerably less than \$300 billion a year additional .

Thus, merely by using the model of U.S. industry we could pay for modernization. It's not a complex or high-risk model. It's been proven. It would give us the force structure we need for the next 10 years, one enabling us to stay in NATO with the presence necessary for providing continued stability. NATO has done its job magnificently for the last 50 years. If we make the necessary effort now to modernize its forces, the Alliance can continue to be a successful presence for peace and security well into the 21st century.

CHAPTER 10

MODERNIZATION, RESTRUCTURING, ADAPTATION: IMPERATIVES FOR NATO FORCES

Jay Garner

In discussing the future military force requirements in Europe, we find ourselves in a fundamentally different security environment than that faced prior to 1989. But we find that essentially our force structure hasn't changed much since the early post-Cold War drawdown was completed. In the future, one enduring feature of the Alliance is likely to be that the United States will maintain a trans-Atlantic commitment to NATO. But the key to that would be whether the United States can achieve a balance between its peacekeeping role in NATO and elsewhere, on one hand, and its more central task of fighting and winning the nation's wars wherever they occur, on the other. The United States must successfully adapt itself now for these varied roles that lie ahead. In the future a premium will be placed on full-spectrum capabilities. However, the objective of military operations—and it will not change—is to impose our will and restore the peace. The question thus is how do we redesign our forces to achieve this objective.

How much have the forces in Europe changed? Not much. We've reduced quite a bit. We're smaller, we're more modern, but we haven't changed much in character. Our set of capabilities, especially in our Army forces in Europe, is essentially unchanged. The Army's four heavy brigades have no more out-of-sector capability than the four divisions we had there 8 years ago. Our NATO allies are falling behind technologically, a development driven by the reduced resources allocated for defense. For example, the percentage of GDP going into defense in Germany has declined over the last 8 years from 3 percent down to about 1-1/2 percent. This decline was reflected in Germany's

relative contribution to the air and missile campaign in Kosovo. The United States flew 80 percent of the strike sorties, 90 percent of the intelligence sorties, and 90 percent of the electronic warfare sorties. The United States fired a little over 80 percent of the precision munitions and over 90 percent of the cruise missiles.

While the success of Operation ALLIED FORCE is further evidence of the steady improvement in the effectiveness and lethality of air and missile power, there was still marginal effectiveness of air power against Serbian forces because they were hard to find and thus hard to hit. The Kosovo Liberation Army, acting as a surrogate ground force, finally flushed them out and made them mass. As they began to move, they became easier to hit by air forces.

What appeared to be a tardy deployment of Task Force Hawk into northern Albania highlighted a growing perception that the Army remained something of a strategic dinosaur. The Army needs to restructure itself now rather than postponing its restructuring until the Army After Next (AAN). That sentiment is not intended to denigrate the AAN. Conceptualizing the AAN was a valuable intellectual exercise, and the Army should receive immense credit for energetically thinking about the future. But there are a reshaping and refocusing that need to happen in the Army today.

During Operation ALLIED FORCE, most of the NATO air forces were unable to fight beside the U.S. Air Force. There is thus the need for a comprehensive modernization program for key European allies, and there's the need for realistic U.S. planning to integrate low- and medium-level technology forces with American high-tech forces to produce an effective capability for coalition warfare. Ideally, we would like all our allies to have high-tech forces, but in the meanwhile, we must do a better job blending high- and low-tech forces.

In what other ways should future forces change? Certainly they have to be smaller, more mobile, more rapidly deployable. Yet they have to be more potent, more capable of achieving decisive effects. They have to be maintained at a high state of readiness, eliminating the train-and-decay syndrome. The focus of these forces will be the Article 5 heritage of collective defense, providing a hedge against uncertainty. The size of that collective defense effort will be regulated by our considered evaluation of the Russian threat.

The Alliance of the future must also prepare for non-Article 5 missions and out-of-area operations. It must be prepared to integrate new members. It must attend to the growing strategic importance of Turkey and the southern periphery. Our continued dependence on petroleum products will bring greater recognition of Turkey's critical role as a gateway to Asia. It will also sensitize us to the fact that future threats to Europe will in all likelihood be preponderantly on the southern periphery.

Thus, as noted above, future forces should be designed to support a hedging strategy. They would retain some conventional defense capabilities based on our perception of the threat from Russia, but there would be a major reorientation of our headquarters and forces toward greater adaptivity through the entire spectrum of military operations.

As we adapt and shape forces for the future, we need to continually analyze the asymmetric responses our forces will meet. We need to ensure that we're able to deal effectively with each of them. For example, we must be prepared to counter cyberwar, that is, attacks on our computer systems that support particularly critical and vulnerable functions such as planning, force projection, energy grids, and so forth. We must be able to deal with terrorist attacks, both at home and in Europe, asking ourselves realistically how such attacks will affect civilian populations. The huge and growing threat of missile attack

and use of weapons of mass destruction must be dealt with. If we can't deal with them, the Alliance will crack. Many future operations will be conducted in urban settings—witness Somalia and Chechnya. Such warfare presents special problems that must be anticipated and prepared for. Finally, how do we deal with politically unengageable targets? What do we do with an enemy who puts artillery systems next to schools and hospitals, or scatters civilians or refugees in and around tactical vehicles? We will have to decide whether nonlethal means would be appropriate to counter such tactics and, if so, what forms the nonlethal means should take.

As we shape forces for the future, we must capitalize on insights drawn from recent operations such as ALLIED FORCE. First, we need to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of publicly announcing our game plan and self-imposed operational limitations in advance. How willing in the future should we be to telegraph our intent? Second, we need to reexamine the practice of finding and striking industrial and commercial targets within the civilian sector. This practice might prove to be counterproductive, especially over the longer term.¹ Third, we must come to terms with the reality that long-range bombers with precision munitions can realize their tremendous utility on the future battlefield only after mobile tactical targets have been forced to move and mass. Scattered enemy forces in hidden locations remain relatively immune. Fourth, we note that ground forces need to be positioned early and within operational reach of the enemy. By doing so, we preserve an important political and strategic lever that could contribute to the early termination of conflict. Fifth, we find that joint—repeat *joint*—application of military force is more likely to achieve political objectives rapidly and decisively. Single-service solutions lack the versatility, tailorability, and comprehensiveness inherent in the application of full-spectrum violence against the enemy's will. Moreover, if force is worth using at all, it should be applied early and

decisively. The technique of expanding the violence of the attack in piecemeal driblets was discredited in Vietnam, but the lesson still seems not to have sunk in.

What are the changes for U.S. forces in general? Our forces have to have an adaptive structure to accomplish all missions: integration missions on behalf of forces of states applying for NATO membership, Article 5 missions, out-of-area operational missions, and missions descending all the way down to the lower end of the spectrum, such as humanitarian, peacekeeping, peacemaking, etc. We need to ensure that U.S. forces are able to adapt to Alliance structures and procedures so that we retain our Alliance cohesion. There will be continued European reliance upon America's unique strategic reach and access. One example is space, though the Europeans are likely to enter this domain somewhat more ambitiously in the next century. Another example is troop and materiel lift, which remains a sine qua non for out-of-sector operations. There will be a force structure bill we have to pay, compensating for the differing capabilities and technology levels of our NATO allies. We'll have to form liaison cells to serve as surrogates for interoperability. To meet the full spectrum of military obligations, NATO will have to exercise creative ingenuity in fashioning the best mix of forces for particular missions.

With regard to U.S. Army forces, they need to be restructured now, not later, a point made earlier but repeated here for emphasis. They have to have full-spectrum capability, which will entail medium and light forces as well as mobile theater missile defense forces. There has to be a better balance between speed and decisiveness, allowing us to get to the fight more rapidly but with the wherewithal to defend ourselves and do the job. For example, our future cannon artillery system, the Crusader, was designed for yesterday's fight and not for tomorrow's. Because of its weight and size, we cannot get it to distant battlefields easily. In the expeditionary operations of the future, often in austere environments and where time is of

the essence, there will be a huge reliance on early-arriving active forces. We need to structure accordingly.

Air Force capabilities need to be reprioritized. Strategic lift, heavy bombers, UAVs, and space systems are vitally important, serving as highly leveraged enablers in future operations. We need to begin reexamining other programs—for example, the tactical fighter programs—and reassess them in light of the threat and geostrategic environment that we'll likely confront.

To sum up, U.S. forces in Europe haven't been reshaped to meet the challenges and demands entailed by the future geostrategic environment. The Army has to get to the battle quickly, but still with decisive force. There is a direct correlation that we find in our gaming between the length of time it takes to get to the fight and how long the fight will last. Delay translates to prolongation of the war.

Air Force programs should be restructured to reflect an early 21st-century environment. Moreover, we need to redefine air superiority. Air superiority now and in the future is more than superiority over manned aircraft. We have to have superiority over the whole spectrum of missile threats also. European forces in general must be modernized in such a way that they rapidly begin to close the technology gap existing among the national forces. With such steps as these, NATO can expect to meet whatever challenges are presented over the next decade and a half.

ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 10

1. See, for example, Bradley Graham, "Report Says NATO Bombing Killed 500 Civilians in Yugoslavia," *The Washington Post*, February 7, 2000, p. A2.

CHAPTER 11

AMERICA'S DIMINISHING COMMITMENT TO NATO: IMPLICATIONS FOR SERVICE FORCE STRUCTURE

John J. Mearsheimer

In this chapter, I examine the question of where the United States is likely to go over the next 20 years with its force structure in Europe. My main conclusions are, first, that the size of the U.S. military commitment to Europe is likely to shrink steadily over time, and second, that the Air Force is likely to be the dominant service in Europe during this time, at the expense of the Army. I should emphasize that I have long argued that independent air power usually does not play a key role in winning wars. Armies and the tactical air forces that support them are the main determinants of victory. In short, wars are won on the ground. Nevertheless, with regard to the question at hand—U.S. force structure in Europe over the next 20 years—the future lies more with the Air Force than the Army.

To approach this question, one first has to inquire about the strength of the American commitment to Europe. How tight is the link today? What is likely to happen to that link in the future? Second, one has to consider the costs of keeping peace in Europe, because if the U.S. commitment to Europe is weak, as I argue it is, the United States probably will not be willing to incur significant costs to be Europe's peacekeeper. And if we are not willing to fight and die in Europe, that has profound implications for U.S. force structure in that region.

There is no question that Europe, along with Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, is an area of great strategic importance to the United States. But that fact alone does not mean that the United States needs to station troops there. The key issue is whether or not there is a threat in

Europe that justifies maintaining an American military commitment. My view is that there is no serious threat to American interests in Europe today. Nor is there one on the horizon.

The United States needs a motivating threat for two reasons. First, the United States is a remarkably secure great power. Located in the Western Hemisphere, it is separated from the great powers in Europe and Northeast Asia by two giant moats (the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans), and it has a huge nuclear arsenal. Secure great powers usually do not go looking for fights. Indeed, they try to avoid them. Second, the costs of modern war are often great, and committing forces overseas effectively means putting them in harm's way. There has to be a powerful motivating force for Americans, or any other people for that matter, to accept commitments that might lead to war. I often tell students that a good way to think about this issue is to see the movie *Saving Private Ryan*, and then ask: do we have interests in Europe today that would justify putting American troops in that kind of situation?

I believe that there is only one possible threat in Europe (or Northeast Asia) that would justify an American military commitment to Europe with its attendant dangers, and that is the presence of a potential hegemon. Specifically, the United States does not want any state to dominate Europe the way it dominates the Western Hemisphere, because that powerful rival would be a serious threat to the United States. In contemporary parlance, the United States does not want a peer competitor. Instead, it wants a balance of power in Europe. In the event a potential hegemon comes on the scene, the United States prefers to remain on the sidelines and let the other great powers in Europe contain it. But if they cannot do the job, the United States accepts the responsibility. That is the only circumstance in which the United States is willing to fight and die in Europe. Maintaining peace in Europe, while certainly a desirable American goal, is not important enough to justify engaging in deadly European wars.

There is no potential hegemon in Europe today. Russia is an economic and military weakling. It is certainly no threat to overrun Europe, and there is little reason to think that it will be the most powerful state in Europe 20 years from now. But in the unlikely event that this happens and Russia is once again a potential hegemon, the other European powers—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy—should be able to contain Russia by themselves, and not require help from the United States as they did between 1945 and 1990. After all, Germany is now unified and wealthy, which it was not during the Cold War. Furthermore, Russia has only about half the population of the former Soviet Union, which makes it almost impossible for Russia to build a military machine as powerful as the Red Army. This is not to say that a wealthy Russia would be a paper tiger, but only to say that it would not be so formidable that American troops would have to remain in Europe to contain it.

In the absence of a threat to overrun Europe, it will be especially difficult over the long term to convince Americans to pay the costs of keeping troops there and run the risks of getting caught in a shooting war.

There are four other factors that raise serious doubts about the viability of the American commitment to Europe. First, a substantial and growing percentage of the civilian policymakers who would make the decision to send American troops into combat have never served in the military. Nor will most of their children. I believe it would be difficult for leaders in Congress and the executive branch to send lower-class and middle-class Americans out to fight and die when there is no sense of shared risk. Furthermore, the American military is likely to grow increasingly distrustful of civilian leaders who lack military experience and who might be willing to pursue risky strategies because they would not be putting themselves or their children in harm's way. All of this is to say that there better be powerful reasons for putting the American military into troublespots around the world. As emphasized, I see no compelling reason why the United States should fight in Europe.

Second, I do not think that down the road the United States is going to be willing to bear the financial costs of maintaining U.S. forces in Europe. The American economy is booming at the moment, and with the budget surplus we now have, it is relatively easy to pay for keeping 100,000 troops in both Europe and Northeast Asia. But hardly anyone believes that happy situation is going to continue for the next 2 decades. Somewhere in the not too distant future the U.S. economy is going to run into trouble and there is going to be serious pressure to cut defense spending. Calls for the Europeans to do more for themselves will be heard loudly and clearly. The problem will be compounded further when the so-called baby-boomers start retiring after 2011 and begin putting pressure on Social Security, Medicare, and other entitlement programs.

Third, the United States is likely to focus more attention on Northeast Asia than Europe in the future, because China might very well be a potential hegemon that can only be contained by a balancing coalition that includes the United States. If China looks like it might be a peer competitor, and there is no dangerous threat in Europe, the United States will almost surely shift large numbers of military assets out of Europe and into Asia.

Finally, there is the matter of generational change. The national security establishment is presently dominated by individuals who came of age during the Cold War, and tend to see the world very much in terms of that conflict. I include myself in that category. The American commitment to Europe was a sacrosanct mission in the Cold War, because the Soviet military threat was concentrated there. Consequently, it is difficult for old Cold Warriors like myself to imagine U.S. troops leaving Europe. However, it is not likely that the younger generations moving up in our ranks will feel the same connection to Europe.

Let's now return to the subject of America's reluctance to suffer casualties, focusing specifically on the recent war in Kosovo. That conflict highlights nicely how little appetite

the United States has for playing the role of peacekeeper in Europe. There is much talk about how the pilots who helped bring Slobodan Milosevic to heel were heroes. I have great respect for those airmen, but I am uneasy about calling them heroes. The Allies flew about 37 thousand sorties in the conflict, and there was not a single casualty. Moreover, those airmen were flying over Kosovo while massive ethnic cleansing was taking place on the ground below. Yet, they were rarely allowed to fly below 15,000 feet, where they might have been better able to help the victims, because Allied leaders feared that they might be shot down. In other words, the United States and its allies were unwilling to risk a single life to alleviate the suffering of the Albanians on the ground.

Furthermore, the Clinton Administration was so horrified by the thought of using American ground forces in Kosovo that it said early in the conflict that they would never be used to invade Kosovo, even though that threat probably would have helped cause Milosevic to quit the war. In short, Kosovo provides stark evidence that the United States is not inclined to fight and die to maintain peace in Europe.

One might argue that Kosovo was of marginal strategic significance, and thus is not a good indicator of what the United States would do if there was a Russian threat, say, to Poland or the Baltic states. I do not believe, however, that the American people would be willing to fight and die in defense of those countries if Russia or any other state attacked them. We would certainly be concerned if that happened, and we would protest loudly. But the security of the United States would not be at risk. Remember that we were able to manage quite well in the Cold War despite the fact that the Soviets controlled most of Eastern Europe. As long as there is no mortal threat to the United States, it is likely to remain on the sidelines if war breaks out in eastern Europe.

What does the foregoing discussion tell us about force structure? First, the United States is likely to pull its troops out of Europe over the course of the next two decades, mainly because there is no threat in the region serious enough to justify a continued military presence. If a major war breaks out in Europe, most Americans are likely to say, "That's Europe's war—let them deal with the problem." Second, as long as U.S. forces remain in Europe, the Air Force is likely to play a more important role in the region than the Army, mainly because the Air Force is invariably less costly to employ in combat than the Army. Specifically, there are likely to be fewer American casualties if the chosen instrument is air power instead of ground power.

The problem with relying largely on air power is that there are significant limits on what it can do alone to win a war, especially if the adversary has a formidable military. Consider the three main cases where the United States has employed force since the Cold War ended. It conducted a lengthy bombing campaign against Iraq in early 1991, but air power alone could not force Saddam Hussein to capitulate. A ground invasion was necessary to accomplish that goal. American air power was used again in the late summer of 1995 in Bosnia to force Milosevic to the negotiating table. However, it was used in conjunction with a Croatian and Bosnian ground offensive. Kosovo is the only case where air power alone might have won a war, although it is too soon to tell what caused Milosevic to capitulate. It might be that the KLA's growing power on the ground, coupled with a NATO threat to invade Kosovo, turned the tide. Regardless, these three bombing campaigns against weak opponents point up the limits of air power.

The American national security establishment is well aware of this problem and is working hard to develop sophisticated technologies that can markedly increase the effectiveness of air power. The evolving Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), for example, is part of this effort to increase the lethality of American air power. An even more promising solution to this problem is to use American air

power in combination with the ground forces of an ally. As noted, this is what happened in Bosnia in 1995. Also, some argued during the recent war in Kosovo that the United States should have aggressively armed and trained the KLA, and then employed American air power to support KLA offensives against the Serbs.

Actually, the first time the United States employed this approach to warfighting was in Vietnam in the spring of 1972, when the North Vietnamese launched their famous Easter Offensive. Most American troops were out of Vietnam by that point, so the ground war was the responsibility of the South Vietnamese Army. But the United States provided its ally with extensive air support and together they won a clear victory in that campaign. North Vietnam, however, eventually won the war three years later in 1975.

In sum, the United States military is likely to exit Europe over the course of the next 2 decades, mainly because there is no threat in sight to our vital interests in that region. But as long as American forces remain in Europe, U.S. policymakers are not likely to commit their own ground forces to combat. Indeed, they will probably go to great lengths to avoid using the U.S. Army in combat in Europe. When trouble starts, they will instead try to win the war with American air power employed in conjunction with another state's ground forces.

QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND COMMENTARY, CHAPTERS 9, 10, AND 11

QUESTION. With the huge gap between funds required for military modernization and funds actually slated, aren't we in the position of not being able to get there from here?

Lieutenant General McInerney. Clearly, all services are facing certain budgetary strains. That's one of the reasons why we need to reduce our huge infrastructural and administrative tail, enabling us to transfer money from the

noncore business to the core business side. It will be a challenge. No question about it. It's going to take a lot of leadership, and it's going to require different ways of handling the problem. But it can be solved.

Lieutenant General Garner. It takes money. The services are underfunded today, and the Army faces the huge problem of not being able to modernize and recapitalize the force. In fact, it's almost impossible. It will require fundamental redesign of the force to get us out from under that economic burden. It's getting more difficult to recruit because the economy is humming. The repetitive deployments that soldiers make result in great pressures on them from their families to get out, especially since soldiers are not making the money their civilian counterparts are. The quality of life facilities are underfunded. Housing repairs have been put off. Quality of life is poor. We have a force that's getting extremely old. Yet, in replacing that old force we have to build a new type of force that is more rapidly deployable but at the same time is more decisive than the old one was, all in the face of huge problems in recruiting, retention, deployment hardships, and quality-of-life detractors. To meet such challenges will take money.

For the Army, the first area we have to look at is our internal management, trying to increase the productivity of our recruiting force. Over the last 4 or 5 years, the proportion of graduating high school seniors going on to college has increased from a little over 40 percent to over 60 percent. We've lost a third of the market. We have to figure out how we can attract those who have some college. What is it we can offer a young man or woman with some college background? We have to look to their aspirations and the skills they bring and rethink the issue of our grade structure. We have in the form of warrant ranks a whole class of military positions that could be reassessed, creating an attractive opportunity to bring highly qualified people into our service. We must keep them dedicated to the technologies we need, particularly information age technologies, but treat them in a way more commensurate

with their needs, aspirations, and skills. I think those are the kinds of opportunities we have.

Fortunately, the Army enjoys retention rates in excess of what our original goals were. If we can get young men and women through their first 4-year commitments, well over half of them will then stay with us. So we're doing something right in terms of the experience we're giving our first-termers. The problem is to attract them in the first place. The biggest challenge in that regard is to meet the aspirations of those who are now going on to community colleges and will have technical degrees.

QUESTION. Why are we still struggling with inefficient and expensive government in view of the highly publicized initiatives on reinventing government?

Lieutenant General McInerney. An organization can be changed only if change is driven from the top—with conviction. The Pentagon bureaucracy knows the mandatory retirement dates of military drivers, and they know how long a politician willing to shake things up is going to be around. The bureaucracy can drag things out until the drivers depart the scene and thus prevent needed reforms from happening. Moreover, we must stop competing with the private sector in areas where the private sector can do it better. For example, in the Army's logistics modernization, an excellent decision was made to buy a commercial system off the shelf. That decision had to be driven from the top.

We're not getting enough of that type of forceful and courageous leadership. There is a paralyzing political concern over civilian jobs. But we've closed 97 bases, with 80 percent of those having been fully closed. We now have more people from the private sector working on those closed bases than when the government workers were there. They're putting taxable dollars into the community rather than having their wages paid by the government. We know how to achieve these soft landings and humane job transitions. But we lack the political will. When it comes to

bucking the government workers' unions, no meaningful initiative gets out of the Clinton White House. They are not biting the tough bullets. We're going to have to solve these problems no matter who the next president might be.

Lieutenant General Garner. Unfortunately, within the defense establishment itself, part of the culture works against a solution. We could achieve enormous savings in defense infrastructure if we contracted more work out to civilian organizations. But what often happens is that those government organizations that are good candidates for outsourcing belong to someone in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. They are his empire—his turf—and he feels compelled to protect them. The services can't get at those. Take, for example, Jacques Gansler, now the highly respected DoD acquisition executive. Before, when Gansler served on the Defense Science Board, he looked at these infrastructures and found that we could save about 44 billion dollars by civilianizing them and then applying the money to core service programs. But now that he's a member of the Defense hierarchy, he can't find one dollar.

Professor Mearsheimer. There's not much hope for reform of the services and the Pentagon more generally, in large part because of the rather benign threat environment we operate in today. The best way to get at this problem is to think about it in terms of interest-group politics. Inside the national security establishment, there are different interest groups, like DoD, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Then, inside each service we have another layer of interest groups—strategic bombers versus tactical aircraft, light infantry versus mechanized infantry versus armor, and so forth. These various groups have selfish and clashing interests. To bring order to this sprawling structure and make it work efficiently, there has to be a significant external threat that makes it imperative to meld the groups into a lean and mean fighting force. In fact, there is a large literature on this subject, which concludes that militaries tend to operate efficiently only in a high-threat environment where a state's survival is on the line. In extremis, you can't

afford to let the individual bureaucracies behave in selfish and foolish ways. But we live in a low-threat environment today. Consequently, it is unlikely that anyone is going to be able to force effective reform on the Department of Defense. Not surprisingly, the Quadrennial Defense Review was a futile exercise in reform. Future efforts of that kind are not likely to be much more successful.

QUESTION. Isn't it the case that the *potential* employment of ground forces in Kosovo by NATO was what ultimately brought Milosevic to capitulate, and not the application of air power? Given that ground forces cannot be moved quickly to vital areas overseas, isn't it wise to retain significant ground forces forward-deployed in such areas? Don't they provide a large measure of insurance?

Professor Mearsheimer. It is hard to make a judgment at this time on what caused Milosevic to capitulate. We just don't have enough information about his decisionmaking calculus. We certainly can come up with plausible explanations, but until we get some concrete evidence from him or the people around him, it's impossible to say for sure what happened.

I do think that the threat of a ground invasion is an excellent way to deal with problems like Kosovo. Nevertheless, I think it will be difficult to convince the American people to keep ground troops forward-deployed in Europe so that they can be used in future Kosovos. We have managed to keep U.S. troops in Europe since 1990 because it has not been costly to us—at least not up to now. Paying the bills has been easy because of the prosperity of the Clinton years, and the human costs have been remarkably low. Remember, we lost no lives in the Kosovo war. But we may not always be so lucky. If we continue conducting out-of-area missions and humanitarian missions like Kosovo, we risk losing American lives, which I believe will undermine the American commitment to Europe, making it impossible to maintain a presence there over the long term.

QUESTION. Setting aside the specific issue of opposing a potential hegemon, doesn't our continued presence in and commitment to Europe provide a general sense of continuing stability there? Doesn't it forestall European wars that we might otherwise be drawn into?

Professor Mearsheimer. Looking historically at the American commitment to Europe, as well as the British commitment to the continent, it is apparent that we both get drawn into European wars only when there is a potential hegemon on the continent. The British stayed off the continent from 1815, when Napoleon was finally defeated, until the early 20th century, because there was no potential hegemon in Europe. In particular, they did not get involved in the German wars of unification against Austria (1866) and France (1870), because Germany was not a potential hegemon at that point. It is potential hegemons like Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany, and the post-1945 Soviet Union that bring Britain and the United States into Europe's major wars.

Lieutenant General McInerney. Let me return to the earlier issue of air power versus ground power. Air power was successful in Kosovo, but that model will not become universal. The new Army, by adjusting its force structure, will be more mobile and more responsive. True, air power can be brought forward a lot quicker than the Army. But Army forces stationed in Europe will still play a dominant role in central Europe through their reinforcement capability. The ability to project a more mobile force from that area to sites elsewhere in Europe or outside of Europe is indispensable.

QUESTION. Wouldn't prospects for world peace be strengthened if the United States remained disposed to defend forward and nip wars in the bud before they become great wars?

Professor Mearsheimer. The United States is not in the business of nipping great-power wars in the bud. It deploys forces forward to contain potential hegemons from

dominating areas like Europe and Northeast Asia and becoming peer competitors of the United States. If there is no peer competitor on the horizon in either Europe or Northeast Asia, the United States is likely to retreat to the Western Hemisphere and maintain few, if any, military forces in those regions. That has certainly been the pattern of American behavior in the past. Our military commitment to Europe and Northeast Asia in peacetime during the Cold War was not the norm; it was a historical anomaly. China might become a potential peer competitor, however, and if that happens the United States will probably keep troops in Northeast Asia to contain China.

Let me unpack my argument a bit. The United States and Britain, like all great powers, have perfected the art of buck-passing when it comes to containing dangerous adversaries. Specifically, America's goal is to get other states to do the fighting and dying for as long as possible, and to intervene only when it is essential to protect the balance of power. For example, the United States understood clearly in the early 20th century that Wilhelmine Germany was a serious threat to dominate Europe. We were perfectly content, however, to let France, Russia, and Britain deal with the problem while we remained on the sidelines. We finally entered World War I in April 1917—almost 3 years after it started—only because it looked like Germany was going to win the war and become a peer competitor.

We repeated the same pattern when confronted with Nazi Germany. Americans like to talk about how moral and idealistic the United States is when it comes to foreign policy. Yet, what did we do when Adolph Hitler came to power in 1933? Nothing. What did we do when he started World War II in 1939? Nothing. What turned American policy around was the fall of France in May-June 1940; Hitler was then free to attack the Soviet Union without a second front, and we thought Nazi Germany was likely to win that fight. We feared that Adolph Hitler would do what Kaiser Wilhelm was unable to do: establish German

hegemony in Europe, creating a peer competitor for the United States. So the United States began feverishly preparing for war. We were not guided by noble ideals in our dealings with Nazi Germany. We were motivated instead by the logic of realpolitik.

In short, we find a powerful impulse in the United States to pass the buck to other states when faced with a potential aggressor. This same impulse is found in Britain, which is why, going back to the 17th century, it has often been referred to by its European neighbors as perfidious Albion. Like Britain, the United States is a balancer of last resort in Europe. We come in at the last moment and only when we have no choice.

Did we come in too late in World War II, as some suggest? No. Our timing was almost perfect. In World War II, the key issue was which state would pay the awful blood price of beating down the German *Wehrmacht*. Better the Soviet Union than the United States. Appropriately, it was preferable to invade the continent at Normandy in 1944, rather than 1943 or, even worse, 1942. The best strategy from an American perspective was to let the *Wehrmacht* and the Red Army fight for a few years and then for the United States to come onto the continent when the Germans were on the ropes and win the peace. Again, that is how Britain and the United States have tended to operate in the past. The historical record is clear on this. Some might say that if the United States had intervened in Europe in the 1930s, there would have been no World War II. Maybe. Maybe not. But if the United States had tried but failed to prevent World War II, it would have been in the thick of the fighting from the beginning of the war, and many more Americans would have died than was actually the case.

Lieutenant General McInerney. I am glad not a lot of Americans share the foregoing view. We have all heard of the enormous degree of economic interdependence between Europe and the United States. These ties are a reflection of the internationalist stance of American businessmen as

well as the American government. Isolationists are fond of claiming that the growing economic ties got us into World War II. But internationalism has been very successful since 1945. We've had our problems. But clearly the greatest success has been in Europe, and we should continue with the recipe. Fundamentally, the successful recipe is to remain engaged in Europe with a strategic partner that thinks the way we do, that has great wealth, and that in union with us provides a very stabilizing force for the world and the future. The American people that I know will go out and fight for what's right, as will the Europeans, and they've proved it.

QUESTION. Isn't the policy of disengagement, save for periods when we're faced with a hegemon or peer competitor, more representative of the attitudes in Congress than those in the executive branch?

Professor Mearsheimer. Yes, I think that the present administration is less interested in scaling back our commitment to Europe than is Congress, although there are members of Congress who are quite interventionist in their outlook. But I should emphasize that I am making what is basically a structural argument, which is to say that particular individuals and administrations don't have that much influence on what happens regarding the commitment of American forces to Europe. My argument is that powerful structural forces at play in the international system and in the United States are going to make it difficult for any President, whether it is Bill Clinton or a Republican, to maintain forces in Europe (and Northeast Asia) in the absence of a potential hegemon. Franklin D. Roosevelt was certainly internationalist in his inclinations in the late 1930s, but he could not act on his inclinations until the fall of France in June 1940 created a situation where it looked like Germany might overrun all of Europe.

QUESTION. You don't see a difference between attitudes of the presidency and attitudes in Congress, generally speaking?

Professor Mearsheimer. Yes, I do, as I said earlier.

General Naumann. We know what President Roosevelt's intention was—it was to build a world safe for democracy. If the United States no longer accepts that ideal, it will never have troops in Europe or Northeast Asia. But I believe it does. The international structures and institutions erected to assure a stable and peaceful world are not built of stone. We can change them as circumstances dictate to better adapt to current realities. It may well be that at some point in the future America's force commitment to Europe could be adjusted downward, but only after we have created the proper conditions.

Professor Mearsheimer. I understand the argument that this is a period of profound change and that the United States has an opportunity to shape it in positive ways by staying put in Europe and working closely with its allies to spread norms of cooperation and build powerful institutions that can promote peace. But to be honest, I look at international politics in a very different way. I think that states are selfish actors who rarely behave in altruistic fashion. The United States, for example, is mainly concerned with enhancing its own interests, which means making sure it remains the most powerful state in the world. As an American, I believe that is a wise goal, because it enhances the security of the United States. Of course, many people believe that such views are outmoded in the post-Cold War world. I think they are wrong, but only time will tell whether there has been a real revolution in international politics.

QUESTION. Where do the French fit into the puzzle of European security?

Professor Mearsheimer. Throughout most of the Cold War, the French had mixed feelings about the American military presence in Europe. They preferred for the most part a European defense identity independent of the United States. But the French appear to have changed their thinking on this matter in the wake of the Cold War. They

are not trying to decouple the United States from Europe. While France is not as interested as Britain and Germany in keeping the Americans in Europe, the French are at least not trying to push us back across the Atlantic. However, French thinking could change in the next few years, as they have never been fully comfortable with an American military presence in Europe.

QUESTION. Are there any plans to bring Slobodan Milosevic before the International Court of Justice at The Hague?

Professor Mearsheimer. No firm decision has been made, but investigators are gathering evidence on alleged war crimes by Milosevic and his lieutenants. But even if they are eventually indicted, it is not clear that they will be brought to trial.

QUESTION. How do the Guard and Reserve fit into the force structure equation?

Lieutenant General McInerney. The Guard and Reserve play an important role. The Air Force is using Guard and Reserve forces at an increasing rate, and they will be integral to any Air Force military involvement overseas.

Lieutenant General Garner. The Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, and the active Army are going to be together. We can't fight a war without all three of them there. As we redesign the active component, the National Guard will have to mirror that modernization. Thus as we divest ourselves of heavy systems in the active Army, we will have to do the same thing in the National Guard, putting them on the modernization ramp with the active Army.

The Army Reserve will go through a period of redefining and reestablishing its core competencies. The Reserve offers tremendous utility, but we had it doing so many different things that we now need to see where we can consolidate its activities and thus get better use. We've probably taken the Reserve down further than we should

have. We hope to have solutions emerging over about the next 3 or 4 years.

General Saint. Is the military budget going to get worse? Absolutely. On the other hand, has the future of the U.S. military presence in Europe been decided? No, it has not been decided. But there has been a change in U.S. philosophy regarding Europe. The United States, along with the Europeans, made a considered decision that what was happening in Kosovo was so unspeakably outrageous that we would not let it continue regardless of whether it was occurring in a sovereign country outside NATO. We thus decided to intervene. True, the timing and means by which we intervened, all dictated by political considerations, were not such that we were able to prevent significant additional suffering and atrocities. We still have a guilty conscience about that. But we were successful in evicting Serb forces from Kosovo and returning the Kosovars to their homes under conditions of security and hope.

Is Europe still important? It remains important for a variety of reasons. The economic reasons are obvious, but there are other factors that link us to Europe. For example, there are more Poles in Chicago than there are in Warsaw; there are more Croats in Pennsylvania than there are in Croatia, or nearly so. Such affinities generate felt obligations on the part of the United States. When overseas kin of U.S. citizens are in danger, an American response has been predictable.

Europe is important as well for geostrategic reasons. Will NATO, with U.S. participation, have new missions? Yes. However, we have lost the predictability of the Cold War. We knew who the enemy was. Every unit in the Army had a wartime mission in a particular geographic location. Each unit knew who the enemy was on the other side of the boundary, and it trained for the encounter. We do not have an identified enemy today. Thus there is a level of uncertainty throughout the Army as to which enemy our

units are to train to fight. They are reduced to training to achieve certain specified capabilities. That's not sufficient when you're trying to justify your existence, but it is true that we have to train for capabilities.

For example, we must have mobility, and we want to capitalize on technology so that we put people in harm's way only to the minimum extent necessary. The proportion of soldiers who were within musket range in the Civil War was quite high. The proportion of soldiers subject to direct fire nowadays is far smaller. We would rather have fewer people up front where the bullets are thickest and more in the back. This doesn't mean we should neglect working to reduce the tail. But there's a logic to what we try to do. We try to shoot the enemy from longer distances so that the likelihood of his shooting us is a lot less. In Operation DESERT STORM, U.S. Army tanks were killing Iraqi tanks at well over 3,000 meters, and the Iraqis didn't even know our tanks were there. The maximum range of Iraqi tanks is about 2,000 meters, two-thirds of a mile less than ours. They were sitting there eating their couscous when all of a sudden their tanks started blowing up around them. That was a bit unnerving, so technology does serve a useful purpose.

Our technology affects our force structure and our capability to perform. Where is our force structure going? If we are going to have a variety of missions along the spectrum of conflict—interventions ranging from sending a platoon of medics to the Horn of Africa to teach inhabitants how to perform preventive medicine, to an observer mission such as we perform in the Egyptian Sinai, to some medium-level conflict like Kosovo, to major theater war like that in the Gulf—then we will require flexible forces capable of being tailored to meet these different challenges.

The United States does not like to fight alone. It doesn't make good sense to fight alone. It was once said that the only thing more difficult than fighting alone is fighting in a coalition. But fighting in a coalition is far superior to fighting alone. I never really understood that until I became

a NATO commander. Some national units didn't perform as well as others, and I had a tendency to grouse about that. A military colleague took me aside and said, "Butch, you don't understand. These are the people you're going to fight alongside of. These are your compatriots. And if you take this suspect battalion out of the force structure, you will have to replace it with an American battalion or do without." I saw the light. We can't get along without the Alliance, and we can't get along without friends of like mind, those who believe in justice, the rule of law, and human dignity.

Admittedly, we're not going to be part of an alliance during every military action that we as a nation decide to undertake. Thus the Army will need some kind of tailorable force structure which, combined with Air Force, Navy, and Marine complements as appropriate, will form a package that can fight without allies and accomplish the job it is assigned to do.

In alliance theory, the commander ought to be able to take three F-16s, four tanks, three bulldozers, and an Aegis cruiser and make a task force out of them. Then, again in theory, the commander should be able to turn a dial and reconfigure that task force for an entirely different mission. There is no technical reason why those two actions are problematic except the friction in our Alliance bureaucracies. Such friction can be prohibitive, and sometimes the simplest-sounding Alliance actions become undoable. For example, language problems are fairly manageable at the corps level when coordinating a plan because you have a couple of days to work it out. But working out a language problem at squad level when somebody's shooting at you and you have about 30 seconds to react is a horse of a different color. We're working to overcome such frictions in NATO.

Our ability to interoperate and cooperate when our vital interests are at stake is very key. I'll illustrate this with a true story from my own experience. During preparations for DESERT STORM in 1990, I got a phone call from General

Carl Vuono, the Army Chief of Staff. He said, "Saint, can you send a division to Saudi Arabia in 60 days?" I said, "Well, Chief, I really think they need a corps. From what I can tell about the situation, they need a command and control element and about two divisions from me, and you can provide another one from the States." "I think you're right," he said, "I'll call you back." Later he called me and said, "Yes, we need a corps. Can you send a corps in 60 days." I said, "Yes, if you will take care of the politics, and if Washington stays off our backs and lets us get on with our business."

Now let me zero in on the part of the story showing the importance for American commanders to be on close friendly terms with their Alliance colleagues, a relationship that derives from our having troops in Europe alongside the allied troops they'll be operating with. I made four phone calls, one to a Dutchman, one to a Belgian, and two to Germans. They were the territorial commanders through whose jurisdictions this 200,000 tons of ammunition, 33,000 soldiers, etc. were going to pass within 30 to 45 days. I said, "Hans, I have a big problem. This is Friday night. On Monday we're going to have to start some big-time moving. Can I send somebody to see you?" Hans said, "Absolutely. Eight o'clock in the morning, I'll see your man in my office, up north, near the border." So we sent somebody up there. By Monday morning we had troops on the move.

Now what if I had had to say to Hans, "Good day, General so-and-so, my name is General Saint. We have never met before, but, pardon me, I would like to borrow all your trains, stop all your highway movement, close down your port, change the priority of shipments on the canals, and I'll be along to talk to you about it and we'll sign a contract on Monday." Could we have pulled that off if at every level of our army in Europe we had not had close, long-standing relationships with the appropriate Dutch, Belgian, and German officials? Absolutely not. If we want cooperation from our European allies, we're going to have to stay there and demonstrate a level of interest that says we're serious.

We can't fly in and fly out, steam in and steam out. We have to be there so they can see us and get to know us and believe that we are there for the long haul.

In dealing with conflict in Europe, it is in the best interests of the United States to plan ahead by supporting and remaining at the forefront of the combined institutional arrangements to resolve such conflict, rather than remaining on our own shores in splendid isolation, deigning to intervene in Europe on an ad hoc basis through occasional crisis management scenarios. Admittedly, there is not going to be a war in central Europe, but it is very unstable around the periphery. It is emphatically in America's interests to keep a strong enough hand in the game to assure that the peripheral instability is not allowed to destabilize the vital center.

CHAPTER 12

WHITHER THE U.S.-NATO PARTNERSHIP: CONSENSUS AND DISSENT

Lloyd J. Matthews

The Cold War is now 10 years behind us, the Warsaw Pact is a distant memory, the Soviet empire is irretrievably shattered, communism is passé, the consumptive Russian bear remains in fretful hibernation, while Operations DESERT STORM in the Gulf and ALLIED FORCE in the former Yugoslavia stand as storied testaments to the decisive superiority of Western arms. Why, then, have grand strategists and defense policymakers become so neurotically worried about our future? Why has the American stance vis-à-vis NATO become so contentious?¹

The answer lies in a simple seven-letter word—history. Historically, reluctant Americans have manned the bastions only when the Huns were at the gate: Europe in the Great War, 1917; Europe in World War II, 1944; Europe in the Cold War, 1949. When victory was secured and the Huns retreated, Americans breathed a sigh of relief, drew down their forces, and came scrambling home: Europe, 1919-20; Europe 1945-47; Europe, 1992-93. True, NATO remained in place after the Cold War expired, and the United States, having been burned in the past, bestirred itself to leave a modest residual force of some 112,000 military personnel on the Continent. But with the actual commitment of those forces to wars in Bosnia and Serbia, America's traditional aloofness to foreign entanglements found new voice, and the issue of whether we should maintain a permanent complement to Europe's own indigenous defenders has risen once again.

The debate surrounding this issue can be glimpsed in terms of its two polar positions, with various gradations in between. On one pole are those who support a powerful

continued U.S. presence in NATO and who hold the corollary view that NATO should for the present supplant its now-dated Cold War anti-Soviet mission with that of securing political and humanitarian order in outlying areas where instability could adversely affect interests of the North Atlantic region or outrage its moral sensibilities.

On the other pole are those who believe that the Europeans are quite capable of waging their own wars and that the United States should accordingly draw back and tend its own garden, refusing to be pulled into overseas embroilments not of its own making and having dubious connections to its security. This cause has been injected into the U.S. 2000 presidential campaign by aspiring Reform Party candidate Patrick Buchanan, but it is embraced by some in the mainstream parties who otherwise have little or no ideological affinity for Mr. Buchanan's political agenda. Let us first examine the school advocating a robust U.S. role in an activist NATO. Perhaps the most forceful and eloquent upholder of this position is U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke.

In his oft-noted book *To End a War* (1998), Mr. Holbrooke's account of the negotiations to stop the fighting in Bosnia, he refers emphatically to the United States as a "European power."² This catchy locution is not of course literally true, certainly not in a geographical sense nor even in a political or economic sense, despite the extensive economic interdependence between the two sides of the North Atlantic and despite the strong political, cultural, and ethnic ties of long standing. No one would cavil at such a figure were it a mere harmless exaggeration made for rhetorical emphasis, but Mr. Holbrooke goes on to invest it with a measure of specific content quite far-reaching in its policy implications. Attend carefully as he here summarizes what it means for the United States to define itself as a European power:

The circumstances that led to the collapse of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia were so extraordinary that it is difficult to

conceive of their recurrence. Yet if history teaches us one thing, it is that history is unpredictable. There will be other Bosnia's in our lives, different in every detail but similar in one overriding manner: they will originate in distant and ill-understood places, explode with little warning, and present the rest of the world with difficult choices—choices between risky involvement and potentially costly neglect. But if during the Cold War Washington sometimes seemed too ready to intervene, today America and its allies often seem too willing to ignore problems outside their heartland. *There will be other Bosnias in our lives*—areas where early outside involvement can be decisive, and American leadership will be required.³

Mr. Holbrooke speaks here for the interventionist school of American foreign policy, those who readily tend to perceive threats to American security whenever serious instability manifests itself on foreign shores, particularly along the verge of greater Europe. Those who hold such views are doubtless correct in prophesying future Bosnias in "distant and ill-understood places," but they are perhaps less persuasive in preddicating American involvement in those Bosnias upon claims that American interests therein are identical to Europe's.

To argue plausibly for a substantial unity of interests between the United States and the European bloc of nations, one would have to be able to demonstrate that the political and economic fates of the two are inextricably and uniquely bound together and that the security concerns of the two are essentially coextensive. However, no one—REPEAT no one—can demonstrate the truth of these prepositions, nor can anyone demonstrate that America's position would ultimately be enhanced if it accepted and acted upon such ideas. The fact is that our long-term interests are devilishly difficult to sort out.

Were the United States to undertake literally the role of European power with its accompanying European perspective and orientation, as opposed, say, to its currently professed role of generic global power, the elements of risk and uncertainty attendant upon such a scenario would be

considerable. As Michael Roskin has pointed out in a cogent analysis, the future direction of Europe rests upon three determinative variables. Will Europe successfully unify or not? Will Germany ascend to the position of Continental leader or not? Will Russia in the fullness of time assume a constructive role in the Western community of nations or not?⁴ We don't presently know the answer to any of these questions.

Assuming that the United States were welcomed with open arms by the other European powers in any decision to become something significantly more than the leading alliance partner—and this is an extremely dubious assumption—then we could perhaps safely dodge some of the issues inherent in Professor Roskin's thorny questions.⁵ But in that case we would be immediately confronted by a host of new and equally discomfiting questions elsewhere in the world, unloosed from Pandora's box by the U.S. declaration that it was henceforth casting its lot with Europe. The delicate balance of security understandings patiently and painstakingly reached by the United States and its worldwide partners over the last half century is not something to be tampered with lightly. Once a big log is pulled from the bottom of the pile, we simply can't predict how far and where the other logs will roll. By the same token, once the United States imparts a major disturbance to international security understandings that have served it long and well, we can't foresee all the primary effects, let alone the secondary and tertiary ripples.

Academics, think-tankers, journalists, and other commentators have the luxury of forming opinions now, often very strong opinions, and stating them in categorical terms. However, policymakers, regardless of their pretensions to clairvoyance, will need to approach in a more cautious vein the weighty question of whether the United States should exchange nuptial vows with Europe. Promising suitors abound, and the United States as a global power may find it more fitting to play the field. Any singular commitment, unwisely made, could do the nation harm and

deny it the fruits of a better future in other areas of the world that steadily grow in importance. Thus, to return to Richard Holbrooke's proposition, should the United States indeed define itself as the alpha male within the European tribe and then begin to act accordingly? One's answer to this question will in all likelihood condition his reading of the future U.S. military presence in Europe.

There can be little denying that NATO, the principal instrument through which the United States has manifested its military presence in Europe since the Alliance's inception in 1949, has been a smashing success, at least through November 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union itself came tumbling down 2 years later. If readers will permit a personal allusion, I can well recall the scenes of lingering wartime devastation and suffering from my first visit to occupied West Germany in the summer of 1951—the shell and bomb holes in the roof of Frankfurt's crumbling old *Bahnhof*, the huge piles of rubble arrayed along the streets of Darmstadt, the ubiquitous displaced persons.

When I returned to Europe during the period 1956-59 as a member of the U.S. Army's 8th Infantry Division, West Germany was now a member of NATO and well along the path toward the miraculous economic transformation that would culminate in the 1980s. Most recently, during visits through Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the former East Germany, I observed a reunited Germany and three new NATO members, all miraculously salvaged from the ruins of a shattered Soviet empire. Yes, there can be little doubt that in facing down and outlasting the Warsaw Pact and its Soviet masters, NATO provided the security umbrella for Europe's historic postwar political and economic resurrection, not to mention the far-forward line of defense afforded the United States itself for the duration of the Cold War.

But times change, and though it is certainly reasonable to put a happy face on NATO's activities between 1992 and

today, there are those at the opposite pole who do not. They view with apprehension such recent NATO initiatives as the actual and promised accession of new members from eastern Europe and extension of the traditional territorial defense mission under the North Atlantic treaty so that it now effectively embraces out-of-sector humanitarian/pacification/restorative operations, possibly as far afield as North Africa and the Persian Gulf.⁶

Though the concerns of Americans opposed to such enlargements of NATO's roles and membership are many, the main reservations are (1) that extension of NATO's protective umbrella to arguably marginal states could needlessly bring us into renewed conflict with Russia; (2) that proliferation of out-of-sector operations could jeopardize American lives for goals not connected to our vital interests; (3) that an increase of members will impair Alliance resolve and unity of effort; and (4) that since U.S. power is finite, any additional investment in European military activities would dilute the resources and energy needed to attend to other pressing obligations on the global scene.⁷ Moreover, to the extent that such reservations begin to jaundice popular sentiment in the United States, NATO's growing baggage could come to adversely affect America's commitment to the alliance and to Europe itself.

It is premature, however, to speculate overmuch at this point on future public attitudes. A better approach is to go ahead and settle tentatively upon which American stance toward Europe and NATO is most likely to serve long-term U.S. interests, and then trust future presidents and legislators to lead the people along the gradually revealed path of enlightened self-interest. And what might that path be? Surveying the 11 authors who contributed previous chapters in the present book, we find that all apparently believe the United States should remain in NATO. Disagreement first enters on the question of whether we should continue to maintain a significant troop presence on the Continent, with Dr. Carpenter and perhaps Professor Mearsheimer being the only proponents of bringing the

troops home. Even here, however, Professor Mearsheimer appears to allow for some continued Air Force presence.⁸ Not until we were confronted with a serious peer competitor would he be willing to return major forces overseas for commitment to an alliance.

The other nine authors can best be described as "traditional old-school," entertaining the belief that despite the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of a near-term Soviet threat, the better part of wisdom lies in maintaining and strengthening the Alliance while retaining a robust U.S. presence. Disagreement within this group centers mainly on the issues of mission and membership enlargement, with Professor Glaser skeptical of undertaking out-of-sector missions and Professor Kaysen equally skeptical of admitting new members. The remaining seven, five of whom are retired or active military officers, strongly support the path that NATO has already set for itself, that is, undertaking all steps necessary "to deliver to the population of the Euro-Atlantic area the conditions which allow stability and security to be taken for granted, so that they can be free to focus on economic development, eradication of poverty, and increased prosperity."⁹

In NATO's view, such a prescription entails continued evolution and adaptation of all aspects of the Alliance, including structure, function, and membership. NATO seeks to establish a process of "dialogue, cooperation, and partnership" with the countries of eastern and central Europe (including Russia and Ukraine) and also with other members of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); to develop close working ties with other European security structures such as the United Nations, Western European Union, and OSCE itself; and to modernize the military command and force structures, with particular emphasis upon updating weapons and equipment of the Alliance's European members and improving their interoperability with those of the United States.¹⁰

Under these broad rubrics, the Alliance has undertaken such initiatives as the Partnership for Peace program, adoption of a concept for combined joint task forces, support of the European Security and Defense Identity, deployment of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (formerly Implementation Force) in Bosnia and the Kosovo Force, and of course admission of three new members along with pursuing a qualification program for prospective additional members. The foregoing catalogue of initiatives is by no means exhaustive, but it serves to convey the flavor of a NATO that, despite its stringent force draw-down in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has since under America's prodding adopted an increasingly activist stance. To this point at least, NATO seems to have pursued a course fairly well aligned with that espoused by Mr. Holbrooke, though perhaps somewhat less aggressive and decisive.¹¹

The Alliance has enjoyed a remarkable degree of cohesion during the period of its ambitious post-Cold War renewal, hanging together even during the centrifugal stresses imposed by Operation ALLIED FORCE in the spring of 1999. But such continued comity is by no means assured. If Lithuania or Estonia, for example, successfully satisfies the technical prerequisites for membership in NATO, an outcome becoming more likely with each passing year, the Alliance may find its declaratory policy on new members at odds with prevailing geo-strategic realities. For Russia is sure to object vociferously to such an "annexation" of erstwhile Soviet territory, and there may well be talk of war.¹² In such a case, some Alliance members could get cold feet, despite the relative toothlessness of the Soviet bear at the time.

Professor Mearsheimer presents a trenchant argument that the United States is unlikely to underwrite with its blood and treasure those European wars in which Europe's own blood and treasure are equal to the task. Despite the trenchancy of his argument, however, there remains a strong consensus—though admittedly not a consensus chiseled in stone for all ages—that the United States so far

as its European commitment is concerned will continue pretty much along the trajectory it has followed for the last half century.

The reasons are as much psychological as strategic. NATO, as several authors have noted, provides a hedge against an uncertain future. President Bill Clinton was born in 1946, only 3 years before the establishment of the Alliance, so that his entire initiation into the external world—the world of geo-politics and international security—took place with NATO as an ineluctable given. Like the UN, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other such institutions, NATO is a familiar and comfortable fixture in the collective consciousness not only of President Clinton's generation but of later generations as well. The United States will likely remain with NATO because it provides a sense of security and, in its original incarnation at least, an abiding peace of mind. Though often neglected in the calculus of grand strategists, simple peace of mind is an essential factor in any rational reckoning of security. But a pattern of out-of-sector interventions seen as excessively adventuresome by member constituencies would undermine such peace of mind. Realistically, therefore, there are built-in limits to how far the Alliance can or should move toward a full realization of Mr. Holbrooke's expansive vision.

As a genuinely global power, with vital interests in the Gulf and Northeast Asia as well as in its own hemisphere, the United States can never afford to focus so single-mindedly on Europe that its affairs elsewhere suffer. The shores of America survey the Pacific as well as the Atlantic, and if we must bestride the latter to attend our eastern flank, we must bestride the former to attend our western. Japan and Korea, along with the budding industrial mini-prodigies lining the southeast Asia rim, already hold a major shareholder's position in the economic intercourse of this country. China the colossus, with its vast portents for good or ill, offers in the long term a more

complex and momentous challenge than Russia itself. But it also offers a momentous opportunity in the form of a potential market of 1½ billion ravenously acquisitive consumers. The success of the United States and the other major powers in managing and accommodating to China's entry upon the global stage could well prove to be the decisive political act in this world over the next century.

In the meanwhile, however, Europe remains the sovereign locus of America's vital interests overseas, and NATO remains the principal structure through which we exercise reciprocal security ties with that continent. We shall in all likelihood find it in our continued interest to remain the leading voice and presence in a vibrant, adaptive Alliance. Our commitment there, however, must be judiciously balanced by competing and no less compelling calls for American leadership and involvement from other points on the compass. Fortunately, Americans are a rich, generous, and enlightened people, fully aware that creative altruism in affairs of state ultimately redounds to their own benefit and indeed to the benefit of all mankind.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

1. For a particularly pessimistic view of NATO, see James H. Wyllie, "NATO's Bleak Future," *Parameters*, Vol. 28, Winter 1998-99, pp. 113-123.
2. Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, New York: Random House, 1998, p. 364.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 368-369 (emphasis in original). See also Richard Holbrooke's article titled "America, A European Power," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 2, March-April 1995, p. 38.
4. Michael G. Roskin, "The Emerging Europe: Power Configurations for the Next Century," *Parameters*, Vol. 29, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 86-97.
5. France, England, Germany, and Greece have in various ways all recently questioned whether Europe should play second fiddle to America the "hyperpower." See, e.g., Craig R. Whitney, "France Presses

for a Power Independent of the U.S.," *New York Times*, November 7, 1999, sect. 1, p. 9; also Craig R. Whitney, "NATO at 50: With Nations at Odds, Is It a Misalliance?" *New York Times*, February 15, 1999, sect. A, p. 7.

6. The best succinct survey of NATO activities since 1990 can be found in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Handbook*, 50th Anniversary Edition, Brussels: NATO, 1998, pp. 27-127. For nine diverse perspectives, see the feature titled "NATO at Fifty" in *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 21, Spring 1999, pp. 7-55.

7. For an excellent survey of the issue of NATO enlargement, to include an objective discussion of pros and cons along with prominent advocates of the various positions, see Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp. 89-121. See also Wyllie, pp. 113-123.

8. Professor Mearsheimer believes that air forces are now the service of choice in future war because their relatively risk-free mode of fighting renders them more appealing to an obsessively risk-averse president and public. However, there is a strong body of research indicating that the casualty hypothesis—which holds that American public support for a military operation will abruptly dissipate once casualties are taken—is invalid. See, e.g., James Burk, "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 114, Spring 1999, pp. 53-78; Andrew P. N. Erdmann, "The U.S. Presumption of Quick, Costless Wars," *Orbis*, Vol. 43, Summer 1999, pp. 363-381; and Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, "How Many Deaths Are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer," *The Washington Post*, November 7, 1999, p. B3.

9. *NATO Handbook*, p. 13.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-17.

11. Mr. Holbrooke, for example, is a strong supporter of NATO enlargement. See "America, A European Power," pp. 42-46.

12. Roskin, p. 95.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

DR. TED GALEN CARPENTER is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC. He is the author of *The Captive Press: Foreign Policy Crises and the First Amendment* (1995); *Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars* (1994); and *A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War* (1992). He is also the author of more than 190 journal, newspaper, and magazine articles and has contributed 19 chapters to foreign policy collections. A frequent guest on radio and television programs in the United States, Europe, and east Asia, Dr. Carpenter has provided commentary for the CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, CNN International, the BBC World Service, and Voice of America. He received undergraduate and graduate degrees from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and holds a Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Texas.

GENERAL WESLEY K. CLARK became the Supreme Allied Commander Europe on July 11, 1997. He is also the Commander in Chief, United States European Command. General Clark's previous assignment was as Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command, Panama, where he commanded all U.S. forces and was responsible for the direction of most U.S. military activities and interests in Latin America and the Caribbean. Earlier, he was Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J5, the Joint Staff, in which position he was the staff officer responsible for worldwide politico-military affairs and U.S. military strategic planning. He also led the military negotiations for the Bosnian Peace Accords at Dayton. As a captain, he served as a company commander in the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam during the period 1969-70. General Clark was a White House Fellow in 1975-76 and served as a special assistant to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. He has also served as an instructor and later assistant professor of social science at the U.S. Military

Academy. General Clark is a 1966 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. He holds a master's degree in philosophy, politics, and economics from Oxford University where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar. He is a graduate of the National War College and the Command and General Staff College.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAY GARNER, U.S. Army, Retired, is President of SY Technology, Inc. He is a former Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. He has served as the Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command; Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; and Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Army Air Defense School. He received a bachelor's degree in history from Florida State University and a master's degree in public administration from Shippensburg University. General Garner began his military service with the Florida Army National Guard. Following service as an enlisted Marine, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army in 1962.

PROFESSOR CHARLES GLASER is deputy dean and a professor at the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago. From 1994 to 1996, he served as acting dean of the Harris School, and the following year he was a fellow at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford. After earning his Ph.D. at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, and a research associate at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Before joining the University of Chicago, Dr. Glaser taught political science at the University of Michigan and served on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon. Dr. Glaser specializes in international relations, especially issues of international security and defense policy. In the present symposium on the future of the U.S. military

presence in Europe, Professor Glaser served as co-host and chaired Panel III, all in addition to his symposium presentation (Chapter 7).

DR. JOHN J. HAMRE, the 26th Deputy Secretary of Defense, was sworn in on July 29, 1997. Prior to assuming the duties of the Deputy Secretary of Defense he served as the Comptroller of the Department of Defense (1993-97). As Comptroller, Dr. Hamre was the principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense for the preparation and execution of the defense budget and management improvement programs. Before coming to the Department, Dr. Hamre served for 10 years as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. During this time he was primarily responsible for the oversight and evaluation of procurement, research and development programs, defense budget issues, and relations with the Senate Appropriations Committee. From 1978 to 1984, Dr. Hamre served in the Congressional Budget Office, where he became the Deputy Assistant Director for National Security and International Affairs. In that position, he oversaw analysis and other support for committees in both the House and the Senate. Dr. Hamre received his Ph.D. in 1978 from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. His studies focused on international politics, economics, and U.S. foreign policy. In 1972, he received a B.A. from Augustana College, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, emphasizing political science and economics. The following year he studied as a Rockefeller Fellow at the Harvard Divinity School. Dr. Hamre assumed the directorship of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank, in March 2000.

PROFESSOR CARL KAYSEN is a professor in the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Kaysen came to MIT as a visiting professor in the academic year 1976-77; prior to that, he directed the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. Dr. Kaysen's scholarly work focuses on the intersection of politics,

economics, sociology, and law. His current work deals with the changing concepts of security in the post-Cold War world, including the shifting boundary between national sovereignty and international responsibility and its implications for the security policies of individual countries. In 1987 and 1988, Dr. Kaysen was Chairman of the Editorial Advisory Board for the "Nuclear Age Project," a 13-part television documentary history produced by WGBH-TV, Boston's public television station. The shows aired in early 1989. They are now in wide use in colleges as the basis of courses in international politics and arms control.

DR. F. STEPHEN LARRABEE is a senior staff member at RAND in Washington, DC. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University and has taught at Columbia University, Cornell University, New York University, the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Georgetown University, and the University of Southern California. From 1983 to 1989, he served as Vice President and Director of Studies of the Institute of East-West Security Studies in New York and was a distinguished scholar in residence at the Institute from 1989 to 1990. From 1978 to 1981 Dr. Larrabee served on the U.S. National Security Council staff in the White House as a specialist on Soviet-East European affairs and East-West political-military relations. He is co-editor (with David Gompert) of *America and Europe: A Partnership for A New Era* (1997); author of *East European Security After the Cold War* (1994); editor of *The Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security After the Cold War* (1994); co-editor (with Robert Blackwill) of *Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security* (1989); and editor of *The Two German States and European Security* (1989).

COLONEL LLOYD J. MATTHEWS, U.S. Army, Retired, graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, has an M.A. from Harvard University and a Ph.D. from the University of Virginia, and is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. His overseas tours

included Germany and Vietnam. In other assignments, he was a battalion commander; editor of *Parameters*, the U.S. Army War College quarterly; and the Associate Dean of the U.S. Military Academy. Following retirement from the Army, he was a project manager in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. He is the editor or co-editor of seven books: *Assessing the Vietnam War* (1987), *The Parameters of War* (1987), *The Challenge of Military Leadership* (1989), *The Parameters of Military Ethics* (1989), *Newsmen and National Defense* (1991), *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically* (1998), and *Population Diversity and the U.S. Army* (1999). Additionally, he is the author of some 100 articles, features, reviews, and monographs on military topics in such journals as *Parameters*, ARMY Magazine, *Military Review*, and *Airpower Journal*.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS MCINERNEY, U.S. Air Force, Retired, is Chief Executive Officer and President of Business Executives for National Security, a national nonpartisan organization of business and professional leaders whose purpose is to engage the business community in securing America's future with a more efficient defense establishment. General McInerney retired from military service as Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and as Director of the Defense Performance Review, reporting to the Secretary of Defense. In that capacity, he led the Pentagon's "reinventing government" effort, visiting more than 100 leading-edge commercial companies to assimilate their ideas about business reengineering. In his 35-year career with the U.S. Air Force, General McInerney completed four tours of duty in Vietnam, flight reconnaissance missions during the Cuban missile crisis, and air escort missions in the Berlin Corridor. General McInerney earned a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Military Academy and a master's degree in international relations from George Washington University. He also completed studies at the Armed Forces Staff College and National War College.

PROFESSOR JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor in the Department of Political Science and the College at the University of Chicago. He also is co-director of the Program on International Security Policy. Professor Mearsheimer specializes in international relations theory, national security policy, war and international systems, and deterrence theory. He is the author of *Conventional Deterrence* and *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History*, both published by Cornell University Press. He is presently completing a book on great power politics. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and received his Ph.D. from Cornell University. In the present symposium, Professor Mearsheimer chaired Panel II in addition to his symposium presentation (Chapter 11).

GENERAL KLAUS NAUMANN recently retired from the German army as Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, a post he held for 3 years. General Naumann was born in Munich and joined the *Bundeswehr* upon graduation from secondary school. He served on the staff of the German Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee in Brussels, where he was Chief of the Military Policy, Nuclear Strategy, and Arms Control section. Promoted to brigadier general, he was named Deputy Chief of Staff (Planning) followed by a two-star assignment as Deputy Chief of Staff (Politico-Military Affairs and Operations). General Naumann was the Commanding General of I Corps in Münster, from where he was moved to the position of Chief of Staff, Federal Armed Forces, in 1991. He was made a four-star general at that time. Among his many publications, General Naumann is the author of *Die Bundeswehr in einer Welt im Umbruch (The Bundeswehr in a World of Transition)*.

DR. BERNARD D. ROSTKER became the 25th Under Secretary of the Army on October 26, 1998. As the Under Secretary, Dr. Rostker is the Army's number two civilian leader. He serves as the deputy and senior advisor to the Secretary of the Army. Dr. Rostker assists the Secretary in

fulfilling statutory responsibilities for recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, and mobilizing the Army as well as managing its \$67 billion annual budget and more than 1.3 million active duty, National Guard, Army Reserve, and civilian personnel. Prior to becoming Under Secretary, Dr. Rostker was Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. In November 1996, he was also named Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War illnesses. Dr. Rostker received a B.S. degree from New York University, where he was a Distinguished Military Graduate of the ROTC Program and commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Army Reserve. He also holds master's and doctoral degrees in economics from Syracuse University. In the present symposium, Dr. Rostker introduced the opening speaker, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre, and served as chairman of Panel I. In April 2000, Dr. Rostker was elevated to the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.

GENERAL CROSBIE E. SAINT, U.S. Army, Retired, was born at West Point, New York, on September 29, 1936. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1958 and was commissioned as a second lieutenant of armor. Since that time, he has commanded units from platoon through Army group. General Saint has served extensively with Army units overseas, including two tours in Vietnam, and five tours in U.S. Army, Europe. His assignments in the United States also cover a broad range of command and staff positions, including Joint Secretariat, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Executive Services and White House Liaison Officer, Office of the Army Chief of Staff; and Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff of the Army. General Saint culminated his military career as Commander of the United States Army Europe, Seventh U.S. Army, and Central Army Group (NATO) from June 1988 until his retirement from active service in 1992. Upon his retirement, General Saint established a private consulting firm specializing in foreign relations, national

security issues, and strategic planning. General Saint is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and the Army War College. He was awarded a B.S. degree in engineering from the U.S. Military Academy and holds an M. A. degree in international relations from American University. In the present symposium, General Saint served as co-host; introduced the keynote speaker, General Wesley Clark; and delivered the closing remarks.

MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT H. SCALES, JR., became the 44th Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in August 1997. Previously, he was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations and Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. General Scales served in numerous command and staff positions throughout the Army. His commands include four artillery batteries, two in Germany and two in Vietnam; an artillery battalion in Korea; and the U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma. He also served as Assistant Division Commander, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth U.S. Army. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy and was commissioned in 1966 as a field artillery officer. He holds master's and Ph.D. degrees in history from Duke University.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.
Commandant

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor
Colonel Lloyd J. Matthews, U.S. Army Retired

Director of Publications and Production
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel

Composition
Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist
Mr. James E. Kistler